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ABSTRACT 
This study explains the differing rights of taxpayers, based on the nature of the profession of 
the tax adviser they consult. Those who utilize the services of tax attorneys can rely on the 
protection afforded by legal professional privilege whereas those who obtain their advice 
from non-legal advisers, such as accountants and other tax advisers, cannot claim the same 
protection.  Legal professional privilege is a substantive right which should be extended to 
cover clients of non-legal tax advisers. The continued denial of the privilege to clients of non-
legal tax practitioners while it is availed to those who approach legal practitioners infringes 
the rights to privacy and equality contained in the South African Constitution. The object of 
this research is to show that the common law concept of legal professional privilege is 
amenable to extension so as to cover the clients of non-legal tax advisers. A qualitative 
approach was adopted which involved an in-depth analysis of the origins, rationale as well as 
the requirements for the operation of the doctrine. This also involved a constitutional as well 
as a comparative dimension. The constitutional dimension sought to show that the current 
distinction is untenable under the South African Constitution by virtue of the infringement of 
the rights to privacy and equality.  The comparative dimension presented an analysis of the 
various jurisdictions that have extended the doctrine as well as those that are still to do so or 
have adamantly rejected the idea. The differential treatment of taxpayers based on the 
professional they engage contravenes the privacy and equality provisions and is thus 
unconstitutional. The study demonstrates that legal professional privilege is amenable to 
extension and there is need for legislative intervention as the courts are limited in the extent 
to which they may intervene in light of the separation of powers and judicial deference. Legal 
professional privilege should therefore be extended to protect the clients of non-legal tax 
advisers as opposed to partial protection which subsists at the moment.   
Keywords: Constitutional principles and taxation; legal professional privilege; non-
legal tax advisers                                                                         
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1 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Motivation for the research 
The motivation behind this research is best illustrated by way of an analogy. X Taxpayer 
would like to obtain some tax advice. He goes to a non-legal tax practitioner and tells the 
advisor all the details and also hands over all documents pertaining to his tax affairs for the 
purpose of obtaining tax advice. In the event that the South African Revenue Service (SARS) 
decides to investigate the tax affairs of Mr X for whatever reason they can obtain all the 
information they need from X‘s advisor and they can even call the advisor to testify as to X‘s 
transactions in terms of sections 74 to 74D (Appendix 1 attached) of the Income Tax Act1 
(the Act), which empowers the Commissioner to require a taxpayer or any other person, 
including a tax advisor, to furnish him with any information he may require relating to a 
taxpayer‘s tax affairs. Section 74D empowers the Commissioner to engage in more 
aggressive measures such as inquiries and searches and seizure of documents.2 Sections 80M 
to 80T (Appendix 2 attached) of the Act also compel taxpayers and advisors to report 
‗reportable‘ transactions as part of the anti-avoidance regulations. 
X has a second option which involves obtaining the very same tax advice from a tax attorney. 
In the event of the Commissioner seeking to obtain information about X‘s activities from his 
attorney he will not be able to compel the disclosure of the content of the communication 
between X and his advisor. The communication is protected by legal professional privilege 
and is therefore not subject to the coercive information gathering powers of the 
Commissioner. Should the attorney divulge the information without X‘s authority such 
information cannot be used by the Commissioner for any purpose whatsoever unless X 
waives his right to the privilege.  
In terms of section 67A every natural person who provides professional advice or assistance 
with respect to the application of any Act administered by the Commissioner must register 
with the Commissioner as a tax practitioner. Failure to register attracts penalties in terms of 
                                               
1
 Act  58 of 1962.  
2
 R de Swardt “General Provisions” in M Stiglingh (ed) Silke: South African Income Tax (2009) 932. 
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section 75 which prescribes a fine or imprisonment for a period not exceeding 24 months. 
The registration provisions in the Draft Tax Administration Bill3 are similar to section 67A.  
In a sense therefore, registered tax practitioners are subject to a form of regulation.  This may 
be relevant if privilege is to be extended to non-legal tax advisors.  Registered tax 
practitioners comprise members of the legal profession, chartered accountants and other 
practitioners who are not members of a professional body. 
Section 4 of the Act prohibits the Commissioner or any of his employees or agents from 
disclosing information pertaining to a particular taxpayer unless the information is relevant to 
an investigation or prosecution of serious criminal offences in which case disclosure will be 
made to the National Police Commissioner or the National Director of Public Prosecutions. 
The importance of the section was emphasised in State Tender Board v Supersonic Tours 
(Pty) Ltd4 in which the court admonished a firm of attorneys working for the Tender Board 
which had sought to circumvent the secrecy provisions by obtaining tax information 
regarding to Supersonic Tours ‗unofficially‘. In so doing the court reiterated the stance taken 
in Welz and Another v Hall and Others,5 that, a court will not lightly direct an official of the 
Revenue to divulge information imparted to him by a taxpayer. The rationale behind the 
secrecy provision is to encourage full disclosure to SARS.  
The secrecy provisions seek to protect information supplied by taxpayers from disclosure to 
other parties and prescribe instances and guidelines where such information may be shared 
with other government agencies. As a result it can be said that it is a quasi-privilege. 
However the section protects the taxpayer from disclosure by the Commissioner but does not 
protect the taxpayer from the coercive information gathering powers of the Commissioner. It 
must be noted that the prohibition against disclosure is not absolute6. It may be set aside by 
an order of court and may also be relaxed for example, to allow general disclosures to other 
agencies such as the Statistician-General as well as the Commissioner of the South African 
Police and the Director of National Public Prosecutions. This means that the provisions do 
                                               
3
 B   2010. 
4
 2008 (6) SA  220 (SCA). 
5
 59 SATC 49 at 54. 
6
 L Van Schalkwyk “Introduction and Interpretation” in M Stiglingh (ed) Silke: South African Income Tax (2009) 
8. 
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not provide the required protection that would foster candour between a client and his 
advisor, thus it can be said taxpayers are likely to not be honest in their dealings with SARS. 
The protection provided by privilege on the other hand will increase compliance as it 
addresses the issue at the root, at the point of advice because by the time issues come before 
the Commissioner, an offence will already have been committed. The proposed Tax 
Administration Bill deals with privilege in section 64 but only refers to privilege as it 
currently stands and therefore does not extend privilege to non-legal tax practitioners. In the 
absence of an amendment of the Bill the status quo will remain and taxpayers‘ 
communications with their advisors will continue to be treated differently depending on the 
profession of the advisor they approach.  
As can be seen from the above illustration this is an anomalous situation. As the law currently 
stands, the only reason why a tax practitioner who is not an attorney cannot claim legal 
professional privilege is based solely on the profession of the tax practitioner.  This opens the 
door to the argument that the exclusion of tax practitioners other than legal professionals 
infringes upon the equality clause in the Constitution as well as the right to privacy.7  
The research is motivated by a need to shed light on the inequality that is manifest in the 
system as it stands because the privacy of one group of taxpayers is protected whereas others 
are left at the mercy of the Commissioner‘s coercive information gathering powers. This 
thesis will explore ways in which legal professional privilege can be extended to non-legal 
tax practitioners, thus ensuring that regardless of from whom taxpayer X decides to obtain tax 
advice there will be equal protection of his privacy from the prying eyes of the revenue 
services, thus enabling candour between X and his tax advisor regardless of whether or not 
such advisor is an attorney. The promotion of candour between taxpayers and their advisors 
will ensure that the taxpayer is given appropriate advice and this professional advice may 
actually result in increased compliance with tax legislation.  
 
 
                                               
7
 L Olivier “Privilege and Tax Practitioners” (2008) 125 SALJ 504 at 513. 
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1.2 Theoretical framework 
The law of evidence prescribes that where privilege applies a person is not obliged to answer 
a question or supply information that is relevant to an issue before the court and this should 
be distinguished from the non-competence or non-compellability of a witness.8 The concept 
can further be divided into state and private privilege and there are various forms of privilege 
that subsist in our law. Whereas state privilege is directed at preventing the disclosure or 
admission of information which is detrimental to state interests, private privilege is aimed at 
protecting the interests of individuals.9 According to Zeffert and Paizes10 when a court grants 
a claim of privilege ―it does so not because such evidence is inadequate, rather it is because 
the protection of some higher value, sometimes lying outside the adjudicative process itself, 
has been given primacy even though this might have the effect of obstructing the search for 
the truth‖. A further observation was made by these authors when they stated that ―it is 
becoming increasingly apparent that some of the privileges are growing out of their original 
box which bore the restrictive label ‗evidentiary rule‘ and are assuming the more 
considerable identity of ‗substantive right‘‖.11 
Legal professional privilege entails that communications between a legal advisor and his or 
her client are privileged provided the legal advisor was acting in a professional capacity at the 
time; he was consulted in confidence; for the purpose of obtaining legal advice; which does 
not facilitate the commission of a crime or fraud.12 According to S v Safatsa13 the privilege 
extends ―beyond communications made for the purpose of litigation to all communications 
made for the purpose of giving or receiving advice because confidentiality is necessary for 
the proper functioning of the legal system and not merely the proper conduct of litigation‖. In 
another case it was held that the doctrine is ―based on the basic or fundamental common law 
right of every person of access to the courts, a corollary of which is the right of access to a 
                                               
8
 PJ Schwikkard and SE Van der Merwe  Principles of Evidence 3 ed (2009) 123. 
9
 Schwikkard and Van der Merwe  Evidence 124. 
10
 DT Zeffert and AP Paizes The South African Law of Evidence 2 ed (2009) 573. 
11
 Zeffert and Paizes South African Law of Evidence 573. 
12
 Zeffert and Paizes South African Law of Evidence  625. 
13
 1988 (1) SA 868 (A) 886E. 
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legal advisor which includes the right to consult such an advisor privately and 
confidentially‖.14  
As noted above legal professional privilege has evolved from being a mere evidentiary rule to 
a fundamental rule of process. The United States of America introduced section 7525 of the 
Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 199815 which effectively extended 
the doctrine of privilege to non-tax practitioners through the creation of a ‗tax privilege‘ for 
communications made on or after 22 July 1998. This privilege has attracted judicial mention 
as well as debate as to its efficacy in achieving the goals that the American Congress set out 
to achieve. 
The present research also discusses the situation in New Zealand where in 2005 the 
legislature promulgated the Taxation (Base Maintenance and Miscellaneous) Act16, which 
created a privilege independent of the common law legal professional privilege. This has also 
attracted its fair share of criticism, which will be explored in-depth later in the discussion. 
Not to be outdone the Australian Law Reform Commission in 2008 set in motion a process 
towards extending legal professional privilege to non-legal tax practitioners by 
recommending the creation of a statutory privilege applying to non-legal tax practitioners in 
its report on client legal privilege in federal investigations.17 The proposed privilege is similar 
to the one adopted by New Zealand, that is, a privilege separate and independent from the 
common law. Comment will also be made on the decision of the English Court of Appeal in 
the case of Prudential v Special Commissioner of Taxes18 in which the court held that 
privilege only applied in instances where a attorney had been approached for advice. 
1.3 Research goals 
One of the goals of the research is to show that privilege by its very nature is amenable to 
extension to cover communications made between taxpayers and non-legal tax advisors. The 
                                               
14
 Mandela v Minister of Prisons 1983 (1) SA 938 (A) 957D. 
15
 Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685. 
16
 Act 79 of 2005. 
17
Australian law Reform Commission (ALRC) Report No. 107 (2007) “Privilege in Perspective: Client Legal 
Privilege in Federal Investigations”. http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/alrc/publications/reports/107/  
(accessed 03/09/09).  
  
10 
 
research also aims to explore how the status quo, that is, the non-availability of privilege to 
non-legal tax practitioners holds up when subjected to Constitutional muster, that is, whether 
it violates the Constitution19 by infringing the right to equality20 as well as the legitimate 
expectation of privacy embodied in the right to privacy.21 An attempt will be made to expose 
the unfair discrimination manifest in the continued rejection by the legislature of the need to 
extend legal professional privilege to non-legal tax practitioners. The constitutionality of this 
differentiation appears not to have been tested before either before the courts or by the 
legislature. The research will endeavour to extend the body of knowledge on the Bill of 
Rights to cover taxation issues and prompt the legislature to investigate the issue and 
eventually extend the doctrine to cover tax advice given by non-legal practitioners by 
proposing a suitable approach to do so drawing on the jurisdictions mentioned above. In 
addition as many African countries draw on South African jurisprudence in fields including 
taxation reform, the research would be of assistance with regard to the question of extending 
the doctrine of privilege to cover non-legal tax practitioners in these jurisdictions. 
1.4 Research methodology 
A qualitative approach will be applied in which the first stage will be to explore the 
underlying tenets of the doctrine of privilege and this will involve an examination of the 
common law and case law on the doctrine. This stage will have a historical dimension to it. A 
descriptive approach will thereafter be adopted to highlight the application of the doctrine in 
the Republic through cases and publications.  
Secondly a constitutional approach will be adopted so as to establish the constitutionality or 
otherwise of the position as it stands in the Republic. This will involve testing whether the 
failure to extend the concept infringes on the privacy of those taxpayers who are advised by 
non-legal tax practitioners as compared to those who obtain their advice from tax attorneys. 
This will also involve exploring whether the continued application of legal professional 
privilege to tax attorneys only, infringes the equality provision in the Bill of Rights. 
                                                                                                                                                  
18
 [2010] EWCACiv 1094. 
19
 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
20
 Section 9. 
21
 Section 14. 
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Furthermore the differentiation will be tested against the limitation clause, that is, section 36 
of the Bill of Rights. 
The penultimate stage will be to explore the position in other jurisdictions, that is, the United 
States of America, New Zealand, Australia and England. Legislation and case law from these 
jurisdictions will be analysed to establish how these countries have been able to extend the 
concept of privilege and their motivation for doing so and in cases where extension has been 
rejected, the reasons for the rejection.  
Having established the constitutionality or otherwise of the differentiation, recommendations 
will be made on how to extend the  doctrine to non-legal tax practitioners drawing on the 
experiences of other jurisdictions, specifically the United States of America and New 
Zealand. 
1.5 Structure of the thesis  
The next chapter will explore the various justifications for the existence of privileges in 
general. An in depth analysis of the concept of legal professional privilege will follow in 
which the origins, nature, scope and conditions for the operation of the doctrine are analysed. 
This will involve discussion of literature, and due to the common law roots of the privilege, 
case law will be covered extensively so as to fully illustrate the judicial treatment of the 
doctrine. The chapter will conclude by examining whether the doctrine is amenable to 
extension to non-legal tax practitioners. To achieve this, the underlying tenets as well as the 
conditions for the operation of the privilege which will have been canvassed earlier in the 
chapter will be posited in the tax advisor context. 
Chapter three (3) will focus on the constitutional dimension of this research and involves an 
exploration of the South African Constitution particularly the right to privacy contained in 
section 14 as well the right to equality in section 9. The differential treatment of taxpayers is 
tested against these two rights in order to determine if it is tenable in the South African 
constitutional context. This will also involve determining whether the infringement of the 
rights will be justified in terms of the section 36 limitations clause. 
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Having established that the current situation is untenable under the Constitution, chapter four 
(4) will explore the approaches that have been adopted by other jurisdictions. The section 
7525 tax advisor privilege promulgated in the United States of America, the section 20B to 
20G non-disclosure right in New Zealand, the proposals of the Australian law Reform 
Commission as well as the approach of the English courts will be explored. The approaches 
in the two countries mentioned in this study, the U.S.A and New Zealand, will be covered in 
depth and a critical analysis of each approach will be made.  
Finally chapter five (5) will seek to bring the discussion to a conclusion by recapping the 
discussion as well as exploring the best way in which South Africa can address the issue. 
This is done by further analysing the strengths and weakness of the approaches mentioned 
above. A proposal for a draft tax advisor privilege for South Africa is also contained in the 
chapter. 
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2 CHAPTER 2: PRIVILEGE 
2.1 Introduction 
Central to the topic of the present research is the concept of privilege in general and legal 
professional privilege in particular. While also looking at the main umbrella concept of 
privilege this chapter constitutes an in depth analysis of legal professional privilege, its 
historical origins, its rationale and nature as well as the requirements that have to be met 
before one can successfully claim privilege in respect of particular communications. This 
chapter seeks to put the concept of legal professional privilege within context and by so doing 
illustrate that the historical origins, rationale and requirements of the privilege are amenable 
to extension beyond the realm of attorneys into the specific practice area of non-legal tax 
practitioners and therefore, ought to afford protection to taxpayers who seek tax advice from 
tax attorneys as well as those who seek the very same service from non-legal tax advisors. 
2.2 Privilege 
Privilege entails that a person in a curial or extra-curial process has a personal right to refuse 
to give evidence which is otherwise admissible evidence. According to Zeffert and Paizes22 
the nature of this exclusionary rule is such that when a privilege is invoked the evidence in 
question is excluded not because of its lack of probative value, rather its exclusion is 
occasioned by the need to protect some other higher value. It must be noted that sometimes 
this higher value is something outside the curial system itself. This means that where any 
privilege applies, one cannot be compelled to produce the evidence or communications to 
which it applies, whether it is in the course of curial or extra-curial processes. 
2.3 Private privilege and state privilege  
In the main there are two types of privilege recognized by law, the first being private 
privilege which is aimed at protecting individuals and secondly state privilege which is aimed 
at protecting state interests. The invocation of the second category, state privilege, is usually 
premised on the idea that the information or communication will be detrimental to public 
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policy or harmful to public interest23. Rather than being seen as a form of privilege this 
particular category has been viewed by some as more of an exclusion of certain categories of 
evidence on grounds of public policy rather than being a privilege in the proper sense. This 
was duly expressed in the case of Duncan v Cammel Laird24 where it was stated by Viscount 
Simon LC that ―the withholding of documents on the ground that their publication would be 
contrary to the public interest, is not properly to be regarded as a branch of the law of 
privilege….crown or state privilege for this reason is not a happy expression‖.25 It was the 
reasoning of the court in this case that privilege in its proper form can be waived by a litigant 
whereas in cases in which the interest of the state could be jeopardised it is incumbent upon a 
judicial officer to exercise the rule even if the litigants have no objection to the production of 
the information.  
This distinction between private and state privilege is aimed at positioning the particular type 
of privilege, that is, legal professional privilege, in the wider context in which it operates and 
also that by its nature state privilege is rigid and not amenable to extension. Thus even 
government tax advisors would have to look at the concept of private privilege and ultimately 
legal professional privilege should they be in a position where they might be compelled to 
divulge the contents of advice given to their client, the government, represented by the South 
African Revenue Service (hereafter referred to as the SARS). In the event of litigation 
regarding such matters the state would therefore not be able to rely on state privilege but will 
have to seek the protection afforded by legal professional privilege. This is important because 
the extension of the concept will not only benefit individuals but the state as well, where 
there might be litigation or attempts to gain access to information in its possession, 
particularly in light of the constitutional right of access to information contained in section 32 
of the Constitution. The particular subsection of this right is contained in section 32(1) (a) 
which states that ―everyone has the right of access to any information held by the state‖. 
                                                                                                                                                  
22
Zeffert and Paizes South African Law of Evidence 573. 
23
 Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Evidence 157. 
24
 [1942] 1 ALL ER 587.  
25
 at 595. 
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2.4 Various types of private privilege 
There are various types of private privilege and the first of these is the privilege against self-
incrimination and the right to remain silent. According to this privilege a person is protected 
from being compelled to give evidence that incriminates him or herself and the right to 
remain silent gives effect to the privilege against self-incrimination.26 According to the 
aforementioned authors this privilege and the concomitant right to silence are a natural 
consequence of the presumption of innocence and apply in both criminal and civil 
proceedings. This means that an individual is under no obligation to incriminate himself. 
Thus the burden of proof remains on the prosecution to prove the accused‘s guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt and this is aimed at preventing the admissibility of evidence obtained by 
compulsion, on one hand, as well as to encourage witnesses to give information freely 
without the fear of incriminating themselves. From its nature it is clear that this is clearly a 
curial privilege and cannot be invoked when dealing with extra-curial proceedings such as 
searches and seizure.  
There also is marital privilege which entitles a spouse to refuse to disclose communications 
from the other spouse made during the marriage. This is due to the notion that public opinion 
would find it unacceptable if spouses could be forced to disclose communications received 
from each other.27 As long as the communication was made during the subsistence of the 
marriage it is enough for a successful claim of the privilege. In addition, whereas there is 
scope for compulsion of parents to testify against their children and vice versa, there is 
possibility of a successful claim of privilege where the parent or guardian assists the child 
from the time of arrest, as the communications made in this context are privileged as would 
be communications with a legal advisor. 
In relation to communications to a legal advisor, it is imperative to note that there are other 
professional situations which in any event would call for privilege, but do not. According to 
Schwikkard and Van der Merwe28 there are two conflicting interests at play when deciding 
whether such other relationships should attract privilege. Firstly there is the interest of society 
                                               
26
 Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Evidence 124. 
27
 Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Evidence 154. 
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in preserving and promoting certain relationships and secondly the interest of the 
administration of justice in ensuring that all evidence is before the court and it seems that 
preference is afforded to the second interest, meaning that most other professionals are either 
protected in a limited way or are not protected at all. Amongst these will be found doctor-
patient relationships but only in so far as this does not extend to statements made by patients 
referred for mental observation. Such statements will only be admissible when determining 
the patient‘s mental condition. Those with no recourse to privilege at all include priests, 
insurers, accountants and tax advisors, among others, and it is with the latter two categories 
that this research is concerned. It must be noted that these categories are not entirely bereft of 
protection as they can look to the protection of the Constitution in the form of the right to 
privacy contained in section 14 (d) which provides that everyone has the right not to have the 
privacy of their communications infringed. Schwikkard and Van der Merwe,29 however state 
that this does not afford enough protection as a successful application of the limitations 
clause, section 36 of the Constitution, will result in the protection afforded by section 14 (d)  
being stripped away. As a result it is clear that it is only the legal profession which is afforded 
protection due to the paramountcy afforded to the second interest, namely the interest of the 
administration of justice in ensuring that all relevant evidence is before the court. It is 
therefore imperative to explore the concept of legal professional privilege in order to 
determine whether it can be extended to other categories of professional relationships, 
particularly to non-legal tax advisors. 
2.5 Rationale for the existence of privileges 
2.5.1 Utilitarian arguments 
The place of privilege in jurisprudence has been contested widely with some arguing that the 
search for the truth should be promoted and thus should not be obstructed by legal 
professional privilege. It has been contended by some that privilege has accomplished little 
but the concealment of the truth.30 Indeed it is proclaimed that Jeremy Bentham, the 
champion of utilitarianism, attacked privilege as ―an instrument of darkness, the enemy of 
                                                                                                                                                  
28
 Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Evidence 152. 
29
 Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Evidence 153. 
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innocence and the truth and an expression of the… fox-hunter‘s justice, in which legal 
proceedings are geared towards ensuring that both parties have fair play rather than the 
discovery of the truth.31 Although this might sound like an exaggeration, there seems to be 
some substance to the claims by the opponents of the privilege because indeed the privilege 
does inhibit the search for the truth. However the question that has to be answered involves a 
weighing up of the public interest against the individual interest and one should ask whether 
the two are mutually exclusive when it comes to the issue of privilege. If one considers the 
matter further, one will infer that the privilege does in fact actually further the public interest 
in the proper administration of justice rather than just serve the individual interests as 
postulated by some opponents. 
While some like Bentham were vehemently opposed to privilege, others, like Wigmore 
advocated a qualified application of privilege. Without abandoning the utilitarian cause, 
Wigmore argues that communications made within a given relationship should be privileged 
only if the benefit derived from protecting the relationship outweighs the detrimental effect of 
privilege on the search for truth.32 According to Wigmore in order for a privilege to be 
justified it had to conform to the following requirements:33 
(i). the communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed; 
(ii) this element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance 
of the relation between parties; 
(iii) the relation must be one that in the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously 
fostered; 
(iv)   the injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications must 
be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation. 
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This position therefore advocated a qualified application of privilege but was also criticized 
on the basis that ―weighing-up entails uncertainty and the promotion of candour is only 
possible in an atmosphere of perfect trust‖.34 This approach, where the application of the 
privilege is limited, can be seen in the approach adopted in the Australian case of Grant v 
Downs35 where the majority of the court felt that there were powerful considerations which 
suggest that the privilege should be confined within strict limits. Wigmore, himself a harsh 
critic of the way in which courts and legislatures tended to apply the doctrine of privilege, 
tried to restrict the privilege by setting out a justification which had to be flexible enough to 
rationalize the existence of traditional privileges, yet narrow enough to disfavour the creation 
of new ones.36 Thus the ambit of the privilege was restricted to documents brought into 
existence for the sole purpose of submission to legal advisors for advice or use in legal 
proceedings.37 This resulted in the application of the privilege being confined to curial or 
quasi-curial proceedings. 
The intuitive appeal of the traditional justification lies in the fact that society would suffer 
greatly if the lack of a privilege discouraged clients from conferring with their attorneys.38  
As a result it is clear that the qualified utilitarian basis for privilege recognises the need for 
privileges and the harm suffered in their absence, although proponents of the approach are 
only concerned with systemic rather than individual harm when looking at the fourth 
requirement put forward by Wigmore. It has also been said that by considering only extrinsic 
social policy, the justification elevates the interest advanced by privileges to the same plane 
as the societal interest in ascertaining the truth.39 It must, however, be noted that this 
particular obsession with the net happiness or rather utility of the approach as the proponents 
would like to call it has been one of the focal points of the attacks that have been launched 
time and time again against the traditional justification for the existence of privileges. 
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2.5.2 Criticism of utilitarian approach 
In as much as  Wigmore‘s criteria seeks to rigidify and restrict the concept of privilege it has 
been criticized as being ambiguous and in actual fact having the opposite effect to its 
intended goal of limiting the number of protected relations.  This is so in light of the fact that 
the approach by Wigmore, which amounts to a cost benefit analysis, is aimed not at the 
search for truth versus confidentiality but the search for truth versus the general protection of 
relationships relying on confidentiality which the community believes should be protected.40 
Critics of the traditional approach have tended to attack the very premise that privileges 
actually encourage communications. It has been argued by some that people typically know 
little or nothing about their privilege and that, even if they did, the knowledge would rarely 
alter their communicative behaviour.41 The first part of the argument can easily be countered 
because, although the existence of a privilege might not readily encourage people to 
communicate, it is logical to argue that in its absence people will be less willing to 
communicate. This is so because even though the knowledge that communications are held in 
confidence might not readily induce candour, the knowledge that communications might be 
divulged under compulsion or voluntarily by the advisor will definitely deter people from 
communicating fully with their advisors.42  It must be stated that the deterrence of candour is 
too big a risk to take and therefore it is better to have a privilege, even though there is no 
empirical evidence to conclusively show that it encourages communication, than not to have 
any privilege at all. It is dangerous to assume that people know nothing or little about a 
privilege because in any case there is an obligation on professionals to inform their clients of 
the privileges that apply because a failure to do so might actually inhibit candour and 
consequently the provision of the service which the professional purports to provide. 
One of the major shortcomings of the criteria is that it is of limited application in pluralistic 
societies like South Africa because there is much confusion as to whose injury and which 
injury is referred to in the fourth criterion and how it is to be measured.43 Thus it can be said 
that the folly of the utilitarian approach is the focus on systemic harms and the ignoring of 
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specific injury to those actually before the court; the protection of any particular relationship 
or the protection of any particular confidence is not valued as an end in itself.44 This is in 
light of the fact that there are many different societies with differing interests and ideas as to 
which relationships should be afforded protection. It has been argued that instead of limiting 
the privileges that apply it could actually be used to justify the creation of new privileges and 
thus we would be talking not only of the extension of legal professional privilege but the 
introduction of a totally new privilege for non-legal tax practitioners. This is so because 
according to Gewald45 if one were to adopt a wide interpretation of the criteria, the creation 
of a new privilege would be justified. If one were to take the instance of taxpayers (all 
residents are) it can rightly be assumed they favour their individual right to privacy and the 
need to foster relations with their tax advisors based on trust and confidentiality and once it 
can be shown that the forced disclosure of their tax affairs would result in a betrayal of 
confidence so damaging to the relationships that it irreparably harms them, then the creation 
of such a new privilege would be justified.  
One of the premises of Bentham‘s argument is that an act is right if it results in the best 
consequence. The folly of this premise lies in the fact that it can be conversely argued that an 
act is right if it is required by a rule, for example legal professional privilege, where the 
following of such rule will result in the best consequence.46  The aim of rectitude, which is 
the drive behind the utilitarian philosophy, is not the only one purpose of a trial. There are 
some important social needs which are served by the trial and one of these is the moral 
imperative that it is better for the guilty to be acquitted than to establish guilt by rational 
means alone because the latter approach may sometimes violate human dignity and personal 
autonomy.47 Various types of privilege serve this particular objective of the trial process 
because denial of privilege, for example legal professional privilege, will affect the personal 
autonomy of the defendant or witness in light of the coercive and overbearing powers of the 
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state. However, the general good and the utilitarian concern for a net increase in happiness 
are never adequate excuses for limiting human rights.48 
2.5.3 Non-utilitarian approach 
2.5.3.1 Individualistic/human rights approach 
It is only logical that those opposed to the traditional justification for the existence of 
privileges would try to propose a competing rationale to justify or explain the existence of the 
concept. This alternative has been the putting forward of a human rights or individualistic 
rationale centred mainly on the right to privacy and, in light of the South African 
constitutional dispensation could be said to  find expression also in terms of the right of 
access to justice. According to some commentators this rationale focuses on the protection 
that privileges afford to individual privacy.49  This was in response to the utilitarian disregard 
for the individuals affected by privilege and the fact that they relied on some dubious 
behavioural assumption of the public.50 The privacy rationale is based on three questions, 
firstly whether there is a need to keep certain communications confidential, secondly whether 
such need is legally recognizable and thirdly whether this privacy interest outweighs the need 
for information.51 These are questions which can also be asked when looking at whether the 
relationship between a taxpayer and a non-legal tax advisor deserves to be protected by 
privilege.  The answer to the first question in the context of non-legal tax practitioners would 
have to be in the affirmative because there is obviously a need for such communications to be 
confidential. The second aspect would also be satisfied because the right to privacy is 
constitutionally protected and the need to keep the communications with non-legal tax 
practitioners confidential is therefore legally enforceable by virtue of the justiciable nature of 
our Bill of Rights. It is when one comes to the third aspect that problems arise because just as 
the balancing act in the traditional approach is indeterminate so is the balancing act required 
by the human rights approach. The societal need for evidence is just as hard to measure under 
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either rationale and no objective criterion exists to determine the normative weight of the 
privacy interest.52 
According to the rationale, privacy is important for personal autonomy, necessary emotional 
release and promoting free self evaluation and the compelled disclosure of information is 
inherently wrong. This is so because it inflicts two kinds of harm, namely the embarrassment 
of having secrets revealed to the public and, secondly, the forced breach of an entrusted 
confidence.53 The former offends the autonomy of the individual in that he is deprived of the 
right to control the distribution of personal information and the latter offends the right of the 
individual to form private loyalties.54 Although in the present constitutional era it is easy to 
embrace this particular rationale as the true justification, it must be noted that although 
privacy helps to preserve liberty, that very liberty allows the invasion of that of others.55 
Another strand of the individualistic/human rights approach advocates an absolutist rationale 
for the privilege. A major proponent of this approach is Charles Fried56 who saw the role of 
the attorney as that of a friend and as such he is morally right to favour the interest of his 
friend (client) in a way which is not maximally conducive to the greater good and which may 
even be harmful to another particular individual. To bolster his argument Fried argues that 
the individualised relations of friendship and love, as epitomised by the relationship of the 
client and his attorney, differ from and are more intense than the cooler more abstract 
relations of love and service to the community in general57 and thus, it is acceptable for the 
attorney to refuse and not be compelled to disclose the communications that pass between 
him and his client.  Accordingly it is argued that the fact that the relationship is cemented by 
pay does not derogate from the relationship because once it is created it is the client‘s needs 
and not economics that determine its content.  In response to a question whether the privilege 
is justified in light of the harm that may be caused to the adversary who is deprived of 
material that is relevant and perhaps even vital to his case, Fried58 argues that this is indeed 
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justified as long as the harm suffered is institutional and does not exist outside of the legal 
framework. To justify this he argues that it is only a lack of knowledge that prevents the 
client from actually instituting judicial or statutory authority to help him win an immoral case 
or reach an immoral result himself. However, one has to ask whether such an absolutist 
approach is warranted because there is a need to draw the line at some point with regard to 
information which may be covered by the privilege. 
Since the utilitarians argue that the privilege is an instrument to obstruct the search for truth 
by achieving frank disclosure on the part of the client, Alschuler attacks this proposition by 
stating that if the privilege is justified purely on traditional instrumental grounds . . . it is only 
by specious reasoning that one may claim that the privilege ordinarily hinders the search for 
truth. For, if the privilege were abolished, the majority of solicitor-client communications 
would not be made in the first place.59 The question that has to be addressed therefore is 
whether it is fair to compel one to divulge information transmitted in confidence. Thus people 
with legal problems should be entitled as of right, to the services of people who understand 
the system and whose function within the system is to be on their side.60 
2.5.3.2 Criticism of human rights approach 
Theophilopoulos argues that the main problem with a human rights doctrine is that it aims at 
constructing a legal system embodying a supra scientific or divine truth which despite its 
apparent open ended nature has the potential to become absolute and inflexible in practice.61 
This is so because by definition, in the opinion of thinkers such as Nozick a human right is an 
absolute force which can never be justifiably infringed.62 To put things into perspective, it 
must be noted that a rights based doctrine implicitly asserts the most extreme moral claim 
possible; it is not merely concerned with wrong acts but with the distinction between absolute 
righteousness and absolute wrongness.63  It is this particular character of the rationale which 
is dangerous to the administration of justice because it may provide a justification for 
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inflicting suffering in much the same way that claims of righteousness have justified the 
bloodiest acts of holy wars.64  
Another fault with the rationale is that it is an individualizing ideal, giving priority to specific 
basic interests of individuals without concerning itself with its effect on the system as a 
whole.65 It can therefore be argued that proponents of the rationale make the same mistake as 
those who advocate the traditional approach because they think of the individual only while 
ignoring the fact that the individual is a part of the collective.  
2.5.4 Convergence of theories 
From the above it can be seen that the two rationales are divergent but are they really worlds 
apart?  The traditional justification focuses solely on the societal interest whereas the human 
rights rationale focuses solely on the individual interest.  Although the theories have been 
regarded as mutually exclusive they are in fact compatible and share remarkably similar 
ideologies.66 According to Zeffert and Paizes the solution lies in ―extracting what is good 
from each of the discarded models and combining them in a broader, more comprehensive 
vision of the values served by the privilege‖.67 Each of the theories points to a reason why 
there is legal professional privilege but none can claim to have the reason for the existence of 
the privilege.  It can be seen that the problem lies in the conflict between rights (absolutist 
approach) and consequences (utilitarian approach). Zeffert and Paizes68 argue that the two 
sides are reconcilable because:  
". . . although each seems to concentrate solely on either one of individual rights or the 
good of society it assumes that the demands of the other have been satisfied.  Thus the 
absolutists determine the moral worth of the privilege according to the degree to which 
it gives expression to rights, but accept implicitly that the unfettered exercise of these 
rights enhances optimally the common good. Utilitarians on the other hand measure the 
moral worth of the privilege by examining its consequences, but assume that the 
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protection of individual rights is one of the most desirable end-products a utilitarian 
society can pursue. " 
As a result one can therefore argue that full and frank disclosure results in more effective 
legal representation and closer adherence to the law to the benefit of the public interest in 
justice. This is a principle which also supports the argument which is the focus of this 
research that legal professional privilege should be extended to non-legal tax practitioners. 
After all, the basic justification for the privilege is the public interest in facilitating the rule of 
law and it is a practical guarantee of fundamental, constitutional or human rights.69 
It has also been argued that if one were to adopt a full utilitarian perspective rather than a 
rational utilitarian one, it will be easier to reconcile the two because in such an instance the 
human rights rationale will be regarded not as an alternative rationale but a supplementary 
one responding to the limitations of the traditional justification.70 Thus instead of competing 
with the traditional approach, the human rights rationale actually plugs some loopholes in the 
traditional approach, namely the fact that the individual as an integral part of the collective is 
disregarded under the traditional approach.  
It has been argued that those who are of the opinion that the two are mutually exclusive 
labour under two false dichotomies, firstly the dichotomy between justifications that advance 
collective interests and justifications that protect individual interests.71 This dichotomy is 
misleading because the whole idea of rules imposed by society as a collection of individuals 
is precisely so that individuals may enjoy the benefits thereof,72 whether they enjoy such 
benefits through the system or discretely is of no consequence. Therefore when people enjoy 
benefits emanating from rules, for example, privilege, the issue is not whether such benefits 
are being enjoyed systemically or discretely by individuals, rather, the important thing is that 
individuals by virtue of being part of the collective do have such benefits. 
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The second dichotomy distinguishes between instrumental rationales, namely the traditional 
justification and non-instrumental rationales in the form of the human rights rationale. The 
traditional approach, due to its obsession with the societal evils that disclosure would cause, 
is classified as instrumental whereas the human rights approach is classified as non-
instrumental because it justifies privileges primarily by concluding that disclosure itself is 
wrong rather than because of its adverse consequences of disclosure.73 However if one were 
to look closely it will become apparent that the two are in actual fact both instrumental 
approaches because they only differ in their focus area, with the traditional approach focusing 
on the direct consequences of compelled disclosure and the human rights approach focusing 
on the indirect consequences of such compelled disclosure.74 
2.6 The origins of legal professional privilege 
Before one can look at the origins of legal professional privilege it is necessary to explore 
what the privilege is.  According to Zeffert and Paizes the privilege embodies the general rule 
that communications between a legal advisor and his or her client are privileged, provided the 
advisor is acting in a professional capacity at the time, he is consulted in confidence, the 
communication was made for the purpose of obtaining legal advice and the advice does not 
facilitate the commission of an offence.75 These are the requirements of the privilege and will 
be discussed in detail later in this chapter.  
According to the abovementioned authors the rule has its origins in the Anglo-American 
evidentiary system and has undergone significant philosophical changes since its early stages 
in Elizabethan England.76  It has been said that the first duty of an attorney is to keep the 
secrets of his clients77 and it seems that this was what motivated the need for the privilege 
and this is given testament to when one looks at the underlying rationale of the privilege in 
Elizabethan England. The privilege therefore stemmed from respect for the oath and honour 
of the attorney, duty-bound to guard closely the secrets of his client and its operation and was 
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restricted to an exemption from testimonial compulsion.78 From the above justification one 
can see how the privilege in its later stages was to be restricted to the curial process even 
though in its present form it has assumed a more pronounced role as shall be seen from later 
discussion. Therefore, originally, the privilege was meant to protect the honour of the 
attorneys and had little to do with the interests of the public or clients.79  
It was not until the eighteenth century that the philosophy behind the privilege shifted from 
the attorney to the client and this was motivated by the emergence of a school of thought that 
stressed the need to provide the client with freedom from apprehension when consulting a 
legal advisor. According to Zeffert and Paizes this particular shift coincided with the rise of 
the ideology of individualism which sprouted from the political philosophy of John Locke 
and the economic theory of Adam Smith.80 There was, therefore, a shift from giving 
ascendancy to the interests of the society to those of the individual and hence the focus was 
no longer on the protection and maintenance of the honour of the attorney but the interests of 
the client. This explains why even today the privilege belongs to the client and points to the 
fact that the concept is amenable to extension to non-legal tax practitioners as it is focused 
not on the profession but the person seeking advice. According to Unterhalter81 this shift was 
because, instead of honour, the privilege now rested on the principle of candour. 
2.7 Extension to extrajudicial processes 
The privilege came to be viewed as a necessary corollary of fundamental rights, as being 
necessary for the proper functioning of the legal system and not merely the proper conduct of 
particular litigation82 and this prompted the second shift in the functioning of the privilege.  
As a result the privilege was extended to communications made in contemplation of future 
litigation and ultimately to communications made for the purpose of obtaining legal advice.83 
This has also been motivated by a shift of emphasis towards the safeguarding of personal 
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rights and hence the privilege is no longer viewed as a procedural right but as a substantive 
right. It must also be noted that there were considerable socio-political influences at the time 
of this shift and the main influence of this metamorphosis of the doctrine was the increasing 
power of the leviathan in the form of the state. Whereas the common law does not recognize 
a general power of compelling the production of information or documents outside of legal 
proceedings, statutory powers to search and seize have become commonplace.84 This has also 
been necessitated by a situation which Heydon85 explained thus: 
"…human affairs and the rules governing them are complex. Men are unequal in 
wealth, power, intelligence and capacity to handle their problems. To remove this 
inequality and to permit disputes to be resolved in accordance with the strength of the 
parties‘ cases, attorneys are necessary, and privilege is required to encourage resort to 
them and to ensure that all the relevant information will be put before them, not merely 
those the client thinks favour him.  If attorneys are only told some of the facts clients 
will be advised that their cases are better than they actually are and will litigate instead 
of compromising and settling. Attorney-client relations would be full of ‗reserve and 
dissimulation, uneasiness, and suspicion and fear‘, because without privilege, the 
confidant might at any time have to betray confidences…" 
This explains why the privilege does not only apply to criminal matters but to civil matters as 
well. Justice in the courtroom will not be served if privilege can be disregarded during the 
process leading up to a curial hearing.  This shift in approach is canvassed in more detail in 
the next section of this thesis. 
2.8 Nature and scope of the privilege 
As noted above, the common law does not recognize any power to compel the disclosure of 
information outside of the curial process, and as such privilege was a procedural right which 
could only be exercised in the event of commencement of the curial process. The increasing 
power of the state has meant that there have been statutory incarnations authorising the search 
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and seizure of information which in most cases has been used in later litigation, thus putting 
paid to the role and power of privilege if invoked in the curial process. As a result this meant 
that legal professional privilege could be circumvented by way of search warrants as 
privilege only came into effect once the curial process had been commenced. There have 
been various cases in South Africa and other jurisdictions which started to question whether 
this position was tenable. One of the first cases was Andresen v Minister of Justice,86 a case 
in which the applicant contested the search and seizure of privileged documents from his 
attorneys‘ office. It was the applicant‘s argument that if police officers were able under a 
search warrant to seize privileged documents from an attorney‘s office, ―the whole basis of 
professional privilege would be destroyed since documents are only privileged whilst in the 
hands of the attorney or his client‖.87 On the other hand, it was the argument of the 
respondent that ―there is no such thing as a privileged document in vacuo‖88 meaning that a 
privileged document has no meaning save in relation to litigation. Sadly the court decided to 
follow the latter approach holding that ―questions of privilege have always arisen only in 
connection with proceedings in courts of law‖.89 It was also the court‘s finding that if the law 
of privilege were to be applied in cases of search and seizure it would make the execution of 
search warrants impossible in certain cases. As a result the court held that privileged 
documents are not exempt from search and seizure under a search warrant and the only 
recourse available to aggrieved parties was to object to their being used in any litigation 
which may follow.90  
The Witwatersrand Local Division was again presented with an opportunity to reform the law 
with regard to the issue of privilege in the case H. Heiman Maasdorp & Barker v Sec. for 
Inland Revenue91 a case which involved the request by the Secretary for Inland Revenue for 
documents in the possession of the applicants, a firm of attorneys representing a taxpayer. 
The attorneys sought to establish the position in law as failure to hand the documents over 
left them facing prosecution in terms of section 75 of the Income Tax Act while on the other 
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hand doing as demanded by the Secretary would have meant a breach of their duty to their 
client the taxpayer. In this instance it was held that the ―general rule in regard to the attorney 
client privilege is a special one as against the general rights bestowed on the Secretary‖.92 
The court thus held that the documents were privileged and thus could not be attached in 
terms of the general powers afforded to the Secretary for Internal Revenue. 
Any hope that the legal position relating to the treatment of privileged documents in the event 
of a search warrant was on the right track were dashed in the case of Mandela v Minister of 
Prisons,93 where the Appellate Division upheld the Andresen ratio.  The case involved the 
Nobel Laureate Nelson Mandela whilst he was still incarcerated in Robben Island Prison. The 
appeal concerned the rights of the appellant, during his incarceration, in respect of documents 
in his possession and also raised the question whether, whilst so incarcerated, he was entitled 
during an interview with his legal advisor to hand him written instructions relevant to the 
purpose of the legal interview that was taking place. One of the main issues in this case was 
whether the Commissioner of Prisons, by virtue of certain statutory powers, was entitled to 
take into safekeeping privileged documents containing communications between the 
appellant and his legal advisor.   The court held that ―the attorney client privilege is a rule of 
evidence and only became operative in the course of legal proceedings‖.94 The court therefore 
approved the Andresen judgment while criticizing the decision in H. Heiman Maasdorp & 
Barker v Sec. for Inland Revenue by stating that ―it appears as not having postulated a 
development of the privilege in our law, but to have assumed the common law privilege to 
have been wider than the authorities appear to justify... at this stage of our legal development 
it is not at all clear that the attorney-client privilege confers a general immunity against 
seizures in terms of general powers‖.95 According to Zeffert and Paizes ―although the 
decision of the Appellate Division did not expressly commit itself to the view that the 
privilege is merely a rule of evidence which has application only in legal proceedings, this 
was clearly the tenor of its decision‖.96 The appellate division therefore quashed any hopes 
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that professional privilege could be developed to encompass extra-curial searches and 
seizures.  
At the same time it appears that it was not only our jurisprudence which was experiencing a 
crisis of identity with regard to the issue of professional privilege. The Australians were also 
undergoing a similar situation, as demonstrated by the case of O’Reilly v Commissioners of 
the State Bank of Australia97 where the court followed the approach in Crowley v Murphy,98 
that ―the doctrine of legal professional privilege applies only in judicial or quasi-judicial 
proceedings and does not prevent, under the authority of a warrant, the search and seizure of 
documents even if such documents would be privileged from production in legal 
proceedings‖.99 The court therefore held that a solicitor was ―not excused from producing to 
the commissioner of taxation evidence and documents received or created by him while 
acting for his clients...even if those documents would have been privileged from production 
in judicial or quasi judicial proceedings‖.100  These two decisions where in actual fact 
informed by the decision in Grant v Downs where the court applied Diplock L.J.‘s contention 
that ―...privilege of course, is irrelevant when one is not concerned with judicial or quasi-
judicial proceedings because strictly speaking, privilege refers to a right to withhold from a 
court or a tribunal exercising judicial functions, material which would otherwise be 
admissible‖.101 
In the case Andresen it was contended by the applicant‘s counsel that allowing search 
warrants to apply to privileged documents and information would have a startling result and it 
is submitted that this is true. Although no empirical study has been carried out to show that 
such lack of protection would lead to the loss of confidence in the legal profession one can 
safely assume that it is a risk which is not worth taking. This is so because once the belief that 
clients have of the protection of their communications with their legal advisors ―proves 
illusory, the confidential relationship between client and attorney disappears for no client 
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could safely entrust to his attorney or counsel documents or statements prepared by him‖.102 
Thus this would be detrimental to the right of accused persons to put up a virilis defencio of 
their case and in the end justice will suffer. 
Relief came soon after O’Reilly in the momentous decision in Baker v Campbell.103 The facts 
of the case were that the plaintiff retained a member of a firm of solicitors Stone, James and 
Co. of Perth to advise him on certain aspects of a scheme he had devised for the purpose of 
minimising his liability for sales tax. The firm held a number of documents relating to the 
plaintiff some of which had been created for the sole purpose of tendering legal advice to the 
plaintiff, otherwise than in relation to then existing or contemplated civil or criminal 
litigation. The defendant, a member of the Australian Federal Police was granted a search 
warrant authorising him to seize documents held by the firm. The warrant had been issued by 
a magistrate on the basis that information placed before him on oath suggested that there 
were reasonable grounds for suspecting that there were, on the premises of the firm of 
solicitors, originals or copies of certain documents all of which had been created or held for 
or in respect of the plaintiff and certain other persons. It was the magistrate‘s view that there 
were reasonable grounds for suspecting that the documents would afford evidence as to the 
commission by the plaintiff and such other persons of offences against the Sales Tax 
Assessment Act and the Crimes Act. The plaintiff contended that the documents were 
covered by legal professional privilege whereas the defendant argued that even if the 
plaintiff‘s contention was correct the documents may lawfully be seized under the search 
warrant.  The question that the court had to decide was therefore, whether ―in the event that 
legal professional privilege attached to and is maintained in respect of the documents held by 
the firm, can those documents be properly made the subject of a search warrant?‖  
Gibbs C.J104 observed that ―at common law there existed no power to compel a solicitor (or 
anyone else) to divulge information or produce documents, whether privileged or otherwise, 
except in legal proceedings and no power to obtain a search warrant except to search for 
stolen goods which in any event would not be privileged‖.   The increased power of the state 
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and the promulgation of statutes authorising searches and seizures meant that more inroads 
than ever before were being made into the private lives and affairs of citizens.  The court in 
Baker v Campbell looked at various decisions including those referred to above. The court 
also referred to the Canadian decision in Solosky v The Queen105 where, in deciding the 
matter, the court noted that ―recent case law has taken the traditional doctrine of privilege and 
placed it on a new plane. Privilege is no longer regarded merely as a rule of evidence which 
acts as a shield to prevent privileged materials from being tendered in evidence in a 
courtroom. The courts, unwilling to so restrict the concept, have extended its application well 
beyond those limits‖. This was in reference to earlier Canadian cases such as In Re Director 
of investigation and Research and Shell Canada Ltd106 where it was stated by Jackett C.J. 
that ―. . . privilege is a mere manifestation of a fundamental principle upon which our judicial 
system is based, which principle would be breached just as clearly and with equal injury to 
our judicial system by the compulsory form of discovery as it would be by evidence in court. 
. .‖.107 This fundamental principle is that ―the protection . . . afforded to the individual by our 
law is dependent upon his having the aid and guidance of those skilled in the law 
untrammelled by any apprehension that the full and frank disclosure by him of all his facts 
and thoughts…might somehow become available to third persons so as to be used against 
him‖.108  It was the court‘s opinion that the value of the privilege would be impaired if its 
operation were confined to judicial proceedings and if disclosure and confidential 
communications were permitted outside judicial proceedings.109  
The court110 also considered the opinion of the Canadian Supreme Court in Descoteaux v 
Mierzwinski111 by inferring that the court in Solosky v The Queen  
". . . implicitly recognized that the right to confidentiality, which had given rise to the 
rule of evidence that confidential communications passing between a client and his 
legal advisor may not be disclosed in a judicial proceeding without the client‘s consent 
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had also given rise to a substantive rule which would apply in all circumstances where 
such communications were likely to be disclosed without the client‘s consent." 
This approach of the Canadian Supreme Court indicates that in Canadian Law the privilege 
was starting to gain recognition as a substantive right rather than just a rule of evidence. 
Judicial notice was also taken of the approach in the United States of America where it was 
firmly ―established that the privilege is available in administrative proceedings and in 
investigatory procedures in the absence of legislation abrogating the privilege‖.112 It was the 
majority (Murphy, Wilson, Deane and Dawson, JJ) decision that privilege was a substantive 
right rather than a mere rule of evidence and could thus be raised to ward off compulsion by 
way of a search warrant. The telling statement is to be found in the judgment of Dawson J113 
where he stated that: 
". . . the privilege extends beyond communications made for the purpose of litigation to 
all communications made for the purpose of giving or receiving advice and 
this…makes it inappropriate to regard the doctrine as a mere rule of evidence. It is a 
doctrine  based  upon the view  that confidentiality is necessary for  proper functioning 
of the legal system and not merely the proper conduct of particular litigation…thus any 
claim to a relaxation of privilege…must be approached with the greatest 
circumspection." 
The dissenting judgments of Gibbs CJ and Mason J refused to recognise any fundamental 
common law principle which justifies the extension of the concept of privilege.114 
The developments with regard to legal professional privilege in other jurisprudences began to 
influence our own jurisprudence and the first case to question the approach in Andresen 
which was strengthened by the Appellate Division‘s decision in Mandela was the case of 
Cheadle, Thompson and Haysom v Minister of Law and Order.115 The facts of the case were 
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that Andries Raditsela was arrested in terms of a provision of the Internal Security Act.116 
Two days after his arrest he died as a result of injuries suffered in detention. His widow 
instructed a firm of attorneys, Cheadle, Thompson and Hayes, to act on behalf of the family 
in a civil action for damages against the Minister of Law and Order. Pursuant to the 
instructions a clerk employed by the firm interviewed a witness to the arrest of Mr Raditsela, 
Ms Anna Mnguni, and notes were made during the interview as preparation for the litigation 
but were not read to the witness nor were they signed by her. Thereafter senior police officers 
visited the premises of the firm armed with a search warrant and seized the aforementioned 
notes despite the protests of the attorneys that the documents were privileged. The police 
purported to seize the notes on the authority of a search warrant issued under section 20 of 
the Criminal Procedure Act117 authorizing the seizure of a written statement made by one 
Anna Mnguni. In relation to the use of privilege as a defence against search warrants it was 
the court‘s opinion that ―Andresen (and consequently Mandela) should not be regarded as 
unassailable authority, at the very least, it is a decision which will carefully have to be 
reviewed in a suitable matter‖.118 This sentiment is shared by Unterhalter whose argument for 
the recognition of privilege as a substantive right is based on the main role of the courts. In 
his argument made to show the imperative of treating privilege as a substantive right rather 
than a rule of procedure, Unterhalter119 was of the opinion that: 
"since the courts protect our substantive legal rights, the means of access to courts and 
the terms of engagement between the parties before and during legal proceedings 
provide for the substantial form for the protection of substantive rights . . . procedure is 
not value free: it enshrines rights . . . in so far as compulsory disclosure invades the 
confidentiality required to prepare for litigation  and thus so violates the equality of  the 
parties before the court, privilege should be considered a procedural right protecting 
equality . . ." 
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The calls from academia as well as the courts for a reform of the way privilege is regarded 
were answered in the case of S v Safatsa.120 The facts of the matter were that the deputy 
mayor of the town of Lekoa was murdered outside his house by a mob of about 100 persons 
who had pelted his house with stones as well as hurling petrol bombs through the windows. 
When the deceased tried to flee towards a neighbouring house he was caught by some 
members of the mob who disarmed him and assaulted him. Stones where thrown at the 
deceased and some members went to him and battered his head with stones. Thereafter he 
was dragged into the street, where petrol was poured over him and he was set alight leading 
to his death. Eight persons, the applicants in the matter, were charged with the murder of the 
deceased as well as a second charge of subversion. Six of the accused were found guilty of 
murder and were sentenced to death whilst the other two were convicted of public violence 
and where sentenced to five years in jail each. In the hearing before the court a quo many 
witnesses were led, one of whom was a state witness Manete. During Manete‘s cross-
examination counsel for the accused informed the trial Judge that he (counsel) was in 
possession of a statement made by Manete which was prima facie a privileged statement, 
having been made by the witness to an attorney for the purpose of obtaining legal advice. It 
was counsel‘s contention that he was nevertheless entitled to cross-examine Manete on the 
contents of the statement. The trial Judge held that he had no power to order Manete to be 
cross-examined about the statement. The attorney whom the witness had consulted in a 
matter concerning him in relation to the trial was the very same attorney who was the 
instructing attorney acting on behalf of the accused in the trial who then made the statement 
available to counsel.  
In coming to a conclusion on the nature of privilege the court referred to numerous  decisions 
one of which was Euroshipping Corporation of Monrovia v Minister of Agricultural 
Economics and Marketing121 where it was held that ―…inroads should not be made into the 
right of a client to consult freely with his legal advisor, without fear that his confidential 
communications to the latter will not be kept secret…to impose qualifications upon the rule 
of once privileged always privileged would…create an unwarranted inroad upon this 
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fundamental right‖.122 From this one can infer that the court was against the idea of a 
qualified privilege which only applied to curial processes while being rendered powerless 
against a search warrant. It was the opinion of the court that once privilege applied to 
information such veil of privilege should not be pierced by any actions, judicial or otherwise, 
unless waived by the client. The court also considered the decision in Baker v Campbell 
where, according to Botha JA ―the court (in Baker) recognised that…privilege is a mere 
manifestation of a fundamental principle upon which our judicial system is based…the same 
holds true for our own judicial system‖.123 Botha JA quoted extensively from Baker and in 
particular the aforementioned paragraph from Dawson J. According to Zeffert and Paizes 
Safatsa signalled ―a new era in the history of legal professional privilege, one in which the 
privilege will be viewed as but one manifestation of a far broader principle‖.124 The decision 
in Safatsa meant that, in the interests of the legal system as a whole, legal professional 
privilege had to be extended to extrajudicial processes so as to be able to avoid circumvention 
via compulsion by way of such processes such as searches and seizures authorized by search 
warrants. According to Zeffert and Paizes125 the challenge after Safatsa lies in giving 
substance to this fundamental principle while being cognisant of the background of the 
privilege so as to make sure that it is not overly extended.  
It must be noted that the privilege extends to all employees of a law firm who might be privy 
to the case. In S v Mushimba126 (1977 (2) SA 829 (A) the court held that the privilege 
extended to interpreters, articled clerks, secretaries and other employees of the firm. In the 
case a member of the staff of the firm of attorneys who defended the accused had been 
forwarding copies of statements made by the appellants as well as defence witnesses and 
other confidential and privileged material to the Security Branch of the police of which the 
investigating officer who gave instructions State counsel in the matter was a member. The 
court held that there was breach of the privilege as a result and found such a breach to be a 
gross irregularity in the discharge of the case. 
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2.9 Conditions for the operation of legal professional privilege 
According to Zeffert and Paizes127 the principles governing the operation of the privilege 
were brought about when the privilege was still seen as a rule of evidence rather than as a 
right but it is likely that ―the courts will continue to seek guidance from and employ 
them…although they may be departed from in instances where they do not conform to the 
‗fundamental right‘ nature of the privilege‖. As things stand one must be aware that the 
principles apply cumulatively, meaning that should one not be satisfied, the privilege falls 
away. It must be noted that the privilege belongs to the client who must claim it or authorise 
his/her advisor to claim the privilege on behalf of the client.128 
2.9.1 Legal advisor must have been acting in his or her professional capacity 
According to Zeffert and Paizes, whether a legal advisor is acting professionally, is in each 
case a matter of fact.129 An important indicator, though not conclusive, is the payment of a 
fee, but the lack of such a fee does not necessarily mean that an advisor was not acting in a 
professional capacity,130 ―an attorney might well act in a professional capacity… without 
asking a fee‖.131 In deciding whether the advisor was acting in a professional capacity all the 
surrounding circumstances must be considered, for example, the place where the meeting 
took place and the underlying tenor of the conversation.132  
There was also a debate as to whether this particular requirement applied equally to attorneys 
in private practice and those who are salaried legal advisors, the so called in-house attorneys. 
In Mohamed v President of the Republic of South Africa133 the issue that had to be decided 
was whether legal professional privilege attached to communications made to salaried (in-
house) legal advisors when it amounts to an independent legal advisor‘s confidential advice. 
The court referred to English law where it was held that, 
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"…salaried legal advisors are regarded by the law as in every respect in the same 
position as those who practice on their own account…they must uphold the same 
standards of honour and etiquette. They are subject to the same duties to their client and 
to the court. They must respect the same confidences. They and their clients have the 
same privileges".134 
The court went on to hold that to limit the scope of legal professional privilege to clients and 
attorneys in private practice is not justified in law, noting that such a limitation would force 
governments and even private corporations with in-house legal advisors to reorganise, at 
great expense, their modus operandi so that all required advice is obtained from independent 
advisors.135 As a result it can be argued that there is no closed list of factors which one must 
look at when deciding whether an advisor was acting in a professional capacity; rather one 
must look at all the surrounding circumstances in order to answer the question. However, 
according to Hoffman J in Mohamed, in-house legal advisors must be ―…scrupulously aware 
of the distinction between communications made in their capacity as legal advisor and other 
communications which would not be of a privileged nature‖.136  
Gewald137 also mentions an interesting scenario where a client consults an individual 
professing to be knowledgeable in the field but unbeknown to the client is not admitted as a 
professional. Would such information be privileged? One would be inclined to hold that such 
should be privileged because the privilege belongs to the client and if such client consults an 
individual with the bona fide belief that such individual is a legal professional, there is a 
reasonable belief that such communications are privileged and the court should give effect to 
that belief. If it transpires that such a ‗legal advisor‘ is mala fide the original basis for the 
consultation would not have changed.138 
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2.9.2 The legal advisor must have been consulted in confidence 
The basis of privilege is ―confidentiality and when confidentiality ceases, the privilege 
ceases‖.139  Whether the consultation was made in confidence is also a matter of fact and 
according to Zeffert and Paizes confidentiality is ―normally inferred by compliance with 
other requirements of the privilege however such an inference may be rebutted by showing 
that the communication was not of a sort intended to be confidential‖.140 If it can be proven 
that the legal advisor was acting in professional capacity, confidentiality is inferred as there is 
an implied agreement between legal advisors and clients that all communications are 
confidential.141 Again one will have to look at the surrounding circumstances to get an 
indication as to whether the consultation was made in confidence. It may be submitted that 
one needs to look at the venue of the consultation, although not conclusive, it can be argued 
that a consultation held in a place where there is a minimal chance of someone overhearing 
could be a factor. One of the circumstances by which it is commonly apparent that the 
communication is not confidential is the presence of a third person, not being either the agent 
of either client or attorney.142 The client will have willingly abandoned confidentiality and 
privilege if he or she chooses to disclose confidential information to the attorney in the 
presence of a third party. This will also apply in instances where the nature of the 
consultation reflects willingness that it be disclosed to a third party or where the attorney acts 
for two parties who share a common interest.143 The court in the Euroshipping Corporation 
of Monrovia case was faced with such a problem, and after looking at all the surrounding 
circumstances, held that the presence of a third party did not in the circumstances negate the 
applicability of the privilege.144 As a result one has to look at all the surrounding 
circumstances in order to determine if a consultation was made in confidence. 
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2.9.3 The communication must have been obtained for the purpose of 
obtaining legal advice 
It is crucial that the communication be made for the purpose of obtaining legal advice as the 
obtaining of legal advice without fear of information being used against the client is the 
foundational principle on which the privilege is based. As a result, a communication made in 
confidence but not for the purpose of obtaining legal advice will not be privileged.145 
However, in cases where the primary purpose is not the procurement of legal advice, it will 
nevertheless be privileged if it was connected with this purpose.146 A case in point is Lane v 
Magistrate, Wynberg147 where it was held that ―for a communication between a client and a 
legal advisor to be privileged it is not enough for the communication to be made in 
confidence, it must have been made for the purpose of obtaining legal advice and whether a 
particular communication is covered is a matter of fact‖.148  
Due to the elevation of privilege from being a mere rule of evidence to a fundamental right 
this means that ‗for the purposes of obtaining legal advice‘ is not restricted to cases were 
litigation is in course or pending. Therefore all communications made for the purposes of 
obtaining legal advice are covered by the privilege regardless of whether litigation is pending, 
contemplated or not. According to Wigmore ―the relation of client and legal advisor and the 
freedom of entering into it, are of at least equal importance for matters that are still in the 
non-litigious stage and the promotion of the relation in that stage tends to lessen its necessity 
in the further and less desirable stage‖.149  
The aforementioned authors also point out the dilemma posed by section 201 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act150 which limits the ambit of privilege in criminal matters. According to the 
section a legal advisor may be compelled to disclose any communications made by the client 
―before he was professionally employed or consulted with reference to the defence of the 
                                               
145
 Shwikkard and Van der Merwe Evidence 148. 
146
 Zeffert and Paizes South African Law of Evidence 659-660. 
147
 1997 (2) SA 869 (C). 
148
 885C. 
149
 Zeffert and Paizes South African Law of Evidence 660. 
150
 Act 51 of 1977. 
  
42 
 
client‖. According to Zeffert and Paizes151 what this particular section means is not entirely 
clear because protection cannot be withheld until such a time as the client has been charged 
because this would hinder preparation for trial and will most definitely be unconstitutional. 
The authors propose two ways of dealing with this dilemma, the first of which entails 
interpreting the proviso as meaning that only communications made after the client 
contemplated the institution of criminal proceedings are protected.152 However, it can be 
argued that this is an untenable proposition as it limits the application of the privilege and 
consequently the right of access to legal advice without fear of compulsion to produce 
communications made. A more appropriate approach in light of our constitutional 
dispensation would be to ―read the proviso down‖ under the Constitution and if this proves 
impossible, to regard it as unconstitutional and thus get rid of it on the basis that it amounts to 
an unreasonable and unjustifiable limitation of the right to legal advice.153 
2.9.4 The advice must not facilitate the commission of a crime or fraud 
This requirement is important because a criminal or fraudulent enterprise does not fall within 
the scope of the relationship between client and attorney.154 Public policy dictates that where 
the advice is such as to facilitate the commission of a crime or fraud then privilege will not 
apply. However it must be noted that only communications intended to further ongoing or 
future illegal activity are excepted from privilege, with consultations after a crime or fraud 
has taken place being protected.155 It must be noted that this requirement should be 
interpreted in such a way as to protect those ―attorney client exchanges that serve the 
privilege‘s purpose of allowing a client to secure information about laws he must follow and 
to pursue freely his right to effective legal representation. If the client seeks advice in order to 
further illegal activities…the privilege should be pierced‖.156 It must be noted further that the 
legal advisor need not have been aware that the object of his client was illegal. In the United 
States of America a test was established in Clark v United States157 where it was held that the 
                                               
151
 Zeffert and Paizes South African Law of Evidence 660. 
152
 Zeffert and Paizes South African Law of Evidence 660. 
153
 Zeffert and Paizes South African Law of Evidence 660. 
154
 Zeffert and Paizes South African Law of Evidence 662. 
155
 Anonymous 1985 Harvard Law Review 1510. 
156
 Anonymous 1985 Harvard Law Review 1510. 
157
 289 U.S. 1 (1933) 15. 
  
43 
 
party seeking information purportedly protected by privilege ―must make a prima facie 
showing that the client sought the attorney‘s advice for the purpose of furthering wrongful 
conduct…the privilege takes flight if the relation is abused‖. There is a dearth of case law on 
this particular requirement in our jurisprudence. It is submitted that the test enunciated by 
Justice Cardozo in Clark should be followed should the issue come before the courts. 
2.10 Waiver of the privilege 
Waiver of legal professional privilege may be achieved in three different ways, namely, 
expressly, impliedly or imputedly. It must be noted however that since the privilege belongs 
to the client it follows that it is only the client who may waive privilege.158 While express 
waiver is easy to determine the same cannot be said of the other two forms of waiver, that is, 
implied and imputed waiver. It is easy to consider the latter two forms of waiver as one and 
the same thing but the court, in Harksen v Attorney-General of the Province of the Cape of 
Good Hope,159 held that the two are distinct and should not be confused. According to the 
court implied waiver had two requirements, ―firstly the privilege holder must have full 
knowledge of his rights and secondly he or she must have so conducted him or herself that, 
objectively speaking, it can be inferred that he or she intended to abandon those rights‖.160 On 
the other hand imputed waiver is inferred where ―the privilege holder so conducts himself 
that, whatever his subjective intention might be, the inference must in fairness be drawn that 
he no longer relies on his privilege‖.161 The court in S v Tandwa162 held that ―implied waiver 
entails an objective inference that the privilege was actually abandoned whereas imputed 
waiver proceeds from fairness, regardless of actual abandonment‖. 
The Supreme Court of Appeal, in S v Tandwa accepted and applied the Harksen approach. 
The appellants had been charged with the crime of robbery and pleaded not guilty at trial but 
declined to offer any plea explanations. They were duly convicted based on their lack of plea 
explanations and on appeal argued that they had been incorrectly advised by their legal 
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advisor to remain silent and had instead wanted to adduce their own evidence in their 
defence. It was the appellants‘ argument that their conviction was largely due to their legal 
representative‘s incompetence. In rebuttal of the appellants‘ complaint the state wished to 
produce an affidavit by the appellants‘ legal advisor affirming that they had been properly 
advised. The issue before the court was whether the affidavit was admissible in light of the 
fact that communications between legal advisor and client are privileged. It was clear that the 
appellants had not expressly waived their claim to the privilege, thus the court had to decide 
whether waiver could be implied or imputed. The court applied the Harksen ratio and in 
addition relied on Wigmore‘s proposition that ―it is a fair canon of decision that when a client 
alleges a breach of duty by the attorney, the privilege is waived as to all communications 
relevant to that issue‖,163 this is so because it is only fair that the legal advisor be afforded the 
opportunity to rebut the client‘s accusations, thus waiver is imputed. As a result it was the 
court‘s finding that the affidavit was admissible on the basis that privilege with regard thereto 
had been waived. The same rationale is also applied where a client discloses a part of a 
privileged communication in evidence. Fairness and consistency require the whole of the 
statement to be disclosed, except where it deals with separate subject-matters.164 
2.11 Treatment of documents by the court 
Once a claim of privilege has been made the court has an inherent power to examine any 
document in respect of which privilege has been claimed165 as merely a procedural step to 
determine whether the claim of privilege is justified166 . The court also has power to excise 
from an otherwise privileged document portions which are not covered by privilege.167 As 
such it can be seen that the court has an inherent power to avoid the abuse of privilege by 
inspecting documents where the application of privilege is in doubt and to make available for 
argument those aspects of a privileged document which are not protected. 
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2.12 Is legal professional privilege therefore amenable to extension?  
Traditionally the attorney has been the long time family and business friend whom clients 
turn to for advice and help with their problems and troubles, some of which have little to do 
with strict rules of law. In recent years this function of the attorney as the personal advisor, 
especially in business situations, is often paralleled by a similar function of the accountant. 168 
The above statement rings true in today‘s world where there is an increasing overlap between 
the functions of attorneys and accountants especially when it comes to tax matters. As such 
four alternatives have been proposed for dealing with the supposed discrepancies between 
attorneys and non-legal tax practitioners:169 
(i) withdrawal of the privilege from attorneys when they perform the same services as non-
legal tax practitioners; 
(ii) eliminate the attorney client privilege altogether; 
(iii) extend the privilege, partially or totally to non-legal tax practitioners; or  
(iv) retain the status quo. 
It can easily be argued that the first two would be undesirable as they would definitely hinder 
full and frank disclosure to both attorneys and non-legal tax practitioners. The fourth option 
of retaining the status quo is also not tenable because as things stand there is a discrepancy in 
the treatment of the information tendered by clients who approach tax attorneys as opposed to 
those who obtain advice from non-legal tax practitioners, as mentioned in the preceding 
chapter. As such the one viable option is the third option of extending legal professional 
privilege in toto or partially to cover non-legal tax practitioners as well.  The question that 
has to be answered therefore is whether the foundational principles, scope and requirements 
of legal professional privilege are amenable to being extended to cover non-legal tax 
practitioners. 
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As noted above the Utilitarian rationale proposed by Wigmore, as well as the human rights 
rationale, are not mutually exclusive; rather they are complementary. Looking at the 
extension of legal professional privilege to non-legal tax practitioners on the basis of the 
traditional justification one can say that Wigmore‘s requirements are in fact satisfied by such 
an extension. First of all it is clear that communications of a tax nature originate in 
confidence because it is unfathomable that a client would want their tax affairs to be the 
matter of public knowledge. As such it is reasonable to assume that the communications with 
regard to one‘s tax matters originate in confidence and this is essential to the full and 
satisfactory maintenance of the relationship between the parties. Is this a relationship that the 
community feels ought to be fostered? The answer to this question has to be in the affirmative 
because the promotion of candour between the client and tax practitioner means that full 
disclosure is made to the tax practitioner, resulting in proper and lawful advice that can only 
be said to be to the advantage of the fiscus and as a consequence the community. Candour 
will help to increase lawful tax planning and as such compliance with the taxation legislation. 
The injury to the relationship will be greater than the benefit gained by disclosure because 
full disclosure will be hindered, meaning that tax practitioners cannot effectively advise their 
clients on lawful tax planning activities, as well as hindering the ability of the practitioner to 
discourage his or her client from illegal or overly aggressive tax planning. According to 
Zeffert ―the relationship…will be fostered by the protection of this confidence and it is in the 
public‘s interest to encourage tax compliance (own emphasis) and therefore to foster the 
relationship‖.170 
On the other hand when applying the human rights rationale one can safely argue that there is 
a need to keep communications of a tax nature confidential because compelled disclosure is 
inherently wrong in that it will offend the right of people to control the dissemination of 
personal as well as business information and offend the right of individuals to form private 
loyalties.171 Secondly, it can be said that this right is legally recognizable especially in light 
of the enshrining of the right to privacy in our Bill of Rights and the observance of the same 
when it comes to tax advice obtained from legal professionals. When one adopts the 
traditional as well as the human rights application one can see that they are complementary 
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and after considering both rationales credence is lent to the argument for the extension in one 
form or another of legal professional privilege to non-legal tax practitioners. 
The nature and scope of legal professional privilege also make it amenable to non-legal tax 
practitioners. This is so because the privilege belongs to the client and not the professional 
concerned, and Murphy J in Baker v Campbell states that ―it is unfortunate that the privilege 
is commonly referred to as legal professional privilege because it suggests that the privilege 
is that of the members of the legal profession, which it is not‖.172 The privilege is now viewed 
as a fundamental right and as such should be made available to all clients seeking 
professional tax advice regardless of whether they go to a tax attorney or a non-legal tax 
practitioner because such a distinction, as will be shown in a later chapter, constitutes unfair 
discrimination, thus infringing on the equality provision in the Bill of Rights.  The SARS has 
been afforded extensive powers, including searches and seizures, and it is only logical that 
confidential communications between non-legal tax practitioners and their clients be 
protected from these intrusive powers, just like the protection afforded when a client obtains 
advice from a tax attorney. The courts have found in the cases of Heiman Maasdorp173 and 
Jeeva v Receiver of Revenue, Port Elizabeth174 that tax information in the possession of legal 
representatives was protected by privilege. In the former case it was found that the general 
rights bestowed on the Secretary for Inland Revenue did not negate the operation of privilege 
and thus privilege could be raised against such. It would be anomalous to say privilege 
applies when the information is held by a attorney while denying the same protection with 
regard to the same information when in the hands of a non-legal tax practitioner. In the latter 
case the only differences were that the information was being sought by the taxpayer and was 
in the possession of the Receiver of Revenue. 
One needs also to consider whether the requirements of legal professional privilege are 
amenable to extension to non-legal tax practitioners. The first requirement that the advisor 
must have been acting in a professional capacity will be easy to extend to non-legal tax 
practitioners because it is a question of fact, as such the surrounding circumstances will have 
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to be examined in order to determine if the tax practitioner was acting in his professional 
capacity as a tax practitioner. This will cover in-house tax advisors as well as SARS tax 
advisors. The second requirement that the advisor must have been consulted in confidence, 
being a matter of fact as well, should not pose difficulties in extending it to non-legal tax 
practitioners. The surrounding circumstances would have to be taken into account and from 
that it can be inferred whether confidence was an essential aspect of the consultation. With 
regard to the third requirement, it can be stipulated that the privilege will only apply where 
the consultation was made for the primary purpose of obtaining tax advice and it is submitted 
that this will not be difficult to determine. And the fourth requirement can be adapted so as to 
appease those who argue that extending the privilege will further tax avoidance, because the 
privilege will fall away if it can be shown that the consultation was aimed at facilitating the 
commission of a crime or fraud against the Income Tax Act. It can be argued that instead of 
hindering the collection of taxes the extension will actually increase tax compliance because 
clients will make informed decisions and are therefore less likely to engage in impermissible 
tax avoidance. 
2.13 Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the foundational values of professional privilege and discussed its 
development from being a mere rule of evidence to its status as a fundamental right. The 
chapter has also explored the foundations, nature and requirements of the privilege and 
demonstrated how all of these are amenable to an extension to cover non-legal tax 
practitioners. The following chapter will look at the constitutionality of the continued denial 
of privilege to those taxpayers who choose the services of non-legal tax practitioners as 
opposed to their counterparts who utilise the services of tax attorneys.  
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3 CHAPTER 3:  THE CONSTITUTION 
3.1 Introduction 
Having established the original tenets underlying the concept of privilege and the 
requirements thereof, and the differential treatment of clients based on their choice of tax 
advisor as applied in our jurisprudence, this chapter aims to explore the acceptability of the 
status quo in terms of the constitutional dispensation. The South African Constitution through 
the Bill of Rights contains fundamental rights informed by the values of human dignity, the 
achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms as stated in 
Constitution.175 The Bill of Rights binds all the branches of the state as well as all levels of 
government, organs of state, individuals and juristic persons alike. In light of the above the 
chapter will look at whether the particular rights of privacy and equality are infringed by the 
current differential application of privilege on the basis of the profession of the particular 
advisor that a taxpayer approaches for tax advice.  
The analysis commences with a consideration of whether the right to privacy of those who 
approach non-legal tax advisors is infringed and thereafter attention will be shifted to the 
question of infringement of the equality clause and whether such differentiation is justifiable. 
This chapter is aimed at showing that the current approach is untenable in the current 
constitutional dispensation and does not pass constitutional muster. 
3.2 The right to privacy 
As noted in the previous chapter one of the rationales behind the concept of privilege is the 
human rights approach which is grounded in the right to privacy. It follows therefore that the 
first port of call when examining the constitutionality of the denial of privilege to clients of 
non-legal tax advisors is the right to privacy as contained in the Constitution. According to 
section 14 of the Constitution everyone has the right to privacy, which shall include the right 
not to have – 
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(a) their person or home searched; 
(b) their property searched; 
(c) their possessions seized; or 
(d) the privacy of their communications infringed. 
From the section above one can see that the constitutional right to privacy is a self-standing 
right as opposed to the common law where privacy is part of the right to dignity and is 
therefore protected under the actio iniuriarum.176 Although in terms of the common law 
privacy is an independent personality right, the courts have tended to consider claims of 
privacy as infringements of dignity. The express recognition of the right to privacy in section 
14, separate from the right to human dignity in section 10, confirms the independent 
existence of these two personality rights.177  Unlike the common law concept of privacy, 
section 14‘s primary purpose is not to provide a basis for compensation. Instead, cases on the 
right have focused primarily on the validity of laws.178 The main similarity between the 
common law and constitutional treatment of the right, as shall be seen later in the discussion, 
is that in both instances the right applies to a person‘s inner sanctum or personal realm, and as 
one moves away from this personal realm into communal relationships such as business and 
social interactions, the scope of personal space shrinks accordingly.179  
According to Currie and De Waal180 section 14 has two parts, the first guaranteeing the 
general right to privacy and the second protecting against specific infringements of privacy, 
that is, searches and seizures and infringements of the privacy of communications. According 
to Gewald181 enquiries into the privacy provision have been confined to the context of 
intercepting communications and not the protection of confidential information but the 
inclusion of communicational privacy in the ambit of the provision has the potential to 
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influence the post-constitutional position on other professional privileges. Woolman et al 
define the right thus, ―at the very least the right to privacy embraces the right to be free from 
intrusions and interference by the state and others…and this requires that a citizen be free 
from unauthorized disclosures of information about his or her personal life‖.182  Harms JA in 
National Media Limited v Jooste183 stated that  
"…a right to privacy encompasses the competence to determine the destiny of private 
facts….The individual concerned is entitled to dictate the ambit of disclosure for 
example to a circle of friends, a professional advisor or the public…" 
The right to privacy is considered by the courts as being part of the concept of dignitas and 
the breach of such right occurs when there is an unlawful intrusion on someone‘s personal 
privacy or the disclosure of private facts about that person and the unlawfulness thereof is 
judged in light of the contemporary boni mores and general sense of justice of the community 
as perceived by the court.184 
3.3 Application of the general right to privacy 
It has been argued that privacy is difficult to define because it is exasperatingly vague and 
evanescent.185 The first South African case to effectively and thoroughly explore the right to 
privacy is the Constitutional Court case, Bernstein v Bester.186 The applicants were members 
of a firm which became the main auditors of the Tollgate Group. The firm had, without 
qualification, certified that the consolidated annual financial statements of Tollgate Holdings 
Limited and its subsidiary companies fairly presented the financial affairs of the group for the 
years 1990 and 1991. In 1993 Tollgate Holdings was placed under final liquidation leading to 
one of the largest corporate collapses in South African history. After investigations by the 
respondents, the joint liquidators, had been completed it was found that there had been large 
scale irregularities by directors and other officers of the Tollgate Group prior to the collapse 
and this had caused losses of a substantial nature. A commissioner was subsequently 
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appointed to enquire into the affairs of certain companies in the group. Summonses were 
issued requiring applicants to appear before the commissioner and produce documentation in 
terms of sections 417 and 418 of the then Companies Act.187 Prior to the commencement of 
the examination, the respondents‘ attorneys had sent applicants‘ attorneys a memorandum 
containing a list of issues which were to be canvassed at the enquiry. Respondents, however, 
failed to inform the applicants that they considered their firm civilly liable in consequence of 
the manner in which it had carried its professional duties as auditors for the companies in the 
group or that the examination would be aimed at gathering evidence to support such a claim. 
During the enquiry legal representatives of the applicants objected to the constitutionality of 
the proceedings. One of the bases for their objection to the constitutionality of the 
proceedings was the general right to privacy. The court pronounced on the application of the 
right namely that there has to be a legitimate expectation of privacy and also pronounced on 
the scope of the right. 
3.3.1 Legitimate expectation of privacy 
In order for the right to privacy to be invoked there must be a legitimate expectation of 
privacy. According to the court in Bernstein a ‗legitimate expectation of privacy‘ has two 
components namely ―a subjective expectation of privacy and secondly that the society has 
accepted such an expectation as reasonable‖.188Neethling189describes privacy as an individual 
condition of life characterized by seclusion from the public and publicity. The right to 
privacy is therefore designed to afford citizens the right to separate their personal life from 
their public or communal activities. This means that the right is only relinquished when one 
commits acts which may impute or imply waiver of the right, thus signalling an intention or 
implied intention to make the activities in question the subject of public or communal 
discourse and as such they cannot thereafter claim a legitimate expectation of privacy 
because they would have expressly, impliedly or imputedly given up the protection of the 
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right. As such it is argued by Devenish190that ―persons cannot legitimately complain about an 
infringement of privacy if they have either explicitly or implicitly consented to waive their 
rights in this regard . . . for instance, a stripper or centrefold model cannot complain about his 
or her right to privacy‖.  According to Currie and De Waal ―one‘s subjective privacy 
intuitions must be reasonable to qualify for the protection of the right . . . what is reasonable . 
. . depends on the set of values to which one links the standard of reasonableness‖.191 This has 
been the problematic part of the inquiry and the next section will look at the scope of the 
right. 
3.3.2 Scope of the right. 
Neethling is of the opinion that ―the individual himself determines the scope of his interest in 
privacy and this . . . self determination is considered to be the essence of the individual‘s 
interest in privacy and therefore . . . his right to privacy‖.192 Some scholars have argued that 
―privacy is not simply the absence of information about us in the minds of others; rather it is 
the control we have over information about ourselves‖.193 Just how far this right extends has 
been the subject of immense debate and one is reminded of Miller‘s contention that the 
concept of privacy is vague and evanescent. In an application of the legitimate expectation 
test the court in Bernstein per Ackerman J stated that ―the scope of the privacy right was 
closely related to the concept of identity . . . the notion of what was necessary for one‘s 
autonomous identity‖.194  This suggests that the right to privacy contributes to the realisation 
of other values.195  
The court in Bernstein proposed a continuum of privacy interests that would be of assistance 
when considering the scope of the right to privacy. The language of rights suggests absolute 
principles which are inalienable but in light of the fact that the exercise of one‘s rights might 
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infringe on the rights of another it has come to be accepted that from the outset of 
interpretation each right is always already limited by every other right accruing to a citizen,196 
―. . . in the context of privacy . . .  it is only the inner sanctum of a person . . . family 
life, sexual preference and home environment, which is shielded from erosion by 
conflicting community rights . . . Privacy is acknowledged in the truly personal realm, 
but as a person moves into communal relations and activities such as business and 
social interaction, the scope of personal space shrinks accordingly . . .‖  
As a result one can look at the context in which privacy is being claimed to determine 
whether such a claim is justified and the closer it is to the personal realm the more valid a 
claim of privacy is likely to be. Currie and De Waal remind that this is not a new test 
substituting the legitimate expectation test, rather, it gives effect to the earlier test because in 
the ‗truly personal realm‘ an expectation of privacy is more likely to be considered as 
reasonable than a privacy expectation in the context of communal relations and activities.197 
In actual fact it gives substance to the second leg of the legitimate expectation test, that is, 
whether a claim to privacy is one that can be considered to be objectively reasonable. Currie 
and De Waal are of the opinion that although the approach in Bernstein goes a long way in 
the determination of the scope of the right to privacy, it does not fully add substance to the 
concept of reasonableness and is more of an ad hoc enquiry. Thus they suggest an additional 
step which entails looking at the value served by the protection of the ‗inner sanctum‘ and the 
‗truly personal realm‘. Since privacy is based on a notion of what is necessary to have one‘s 
own autonomous identity, the third step is therefore that an inner sanctum helps achieve a 
valuable good, one‘s own autonomous identity.198  
                                               
196
 484B-C. 
197
 Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 318. 
198
 Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 319. 
  
55 
 
The third step is also crucial in understanding why the right to privacy is extended to 
commercial entities which would not be able to rely on it had the right been anchored in the 
concept of human dignity. According to the Hyundai Motor Distributors199 case, 
―. . . juristic persons are not the bearers of human dignity. Their privacy rights, 
therefore, can not be as intense as those of human beings. However this does not mean 
that juristic persons are not protected by the right to privacy. Exclusion of juristic 
persons would lead to the possibility of grave violations of privacy, with serious 
implications for the conduct of affairs. The state might, for instance, have free license 
to search and seize material from any non-profit or corporate entity at will . . . 
something which would undermine the very fabric of our democratic state . . .‖  
As such it is evident that although the right to privacy becomes less intense as it moves away 
from the personal, juristic persons though devoid of human dignity are also protected by the 
right to privacy. 
It must, however, be noted that the use of such metaphors as ‗inner sanctum‘ and ‗personal 
sphere‘ are misleading to the extent that they suggest that privacy is a space or a place.200 The 
fact that conduct takes place in someone‘s home (or not) is not decisive of the question 
whether it merits the protection of the right to privacy.201 One will therefore have to look at 
whether the conduct is dignity (or autonomy) affirming and that it therefore conforms to the 
principal purpose of the privacy right. 
3.3.3 Informational privacy 
An important aspect of the general right to privacy is the guaranteeing of informational 
privacy. It is aimed at protecting an individual‘s interest in ‗informational self 
determination‘,202 which is, restricting the collection, use of and disclosure of private 
information regardless of whether it  damages or has the potential to damage a person‘s 
                                               
199
 Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd: In re Hyundai 
Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit  2001 (1) SA 545 (CC). 
200
 Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 322. 
201
 Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 323. 
202
 Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 323. 
  
56 
 
dignity. The right to privacy guarantees control over all private information and it does not 
matter whether the information is potentially damaging to a person‘s dignity or not.203 It must 
be noted, however, that just as is the case with other aspects of the right to privacy there must 
be a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
3.3.4 Searches and seizures 
The privacy provision also includes the right not to have one‘s person or home searched, 
one‘s property searched or possessions seized. If such searches and seizures involve an 
invasion of privacy they must comply strictly with all legal and constitutional requirements204 
and the law in question must be in pursuit of an objective that is sufficiently important to 
justify limiting individual constitutional rights.205 Just as in other aspects of the right to 
privacy the guiding principle should be whether the individual‘s subjective expectation of 
privacy must be recognised by society as being objectively reasonable.206 It has been stated 
that the wording of the search and seizure provisions raises many definitional issues with 
regard to terms such as ‗property‘ and ‗possessions‘. Should these terms be given a wide or 
narrow definition? Sachs J207 in Mistry v Interim National Medical and Dental Council of 
South Africa addressing such issues stated that the object of the provision is to protect 
‗people‘ not ‗places‘, personal privacy as opposed to private property. Searches and seizures 
must be conducted in terms of legislation that clearly defines the power to search and seize. 
Hence in Mistry the search and seizure provision challenged was found deficient because it 
gave inspectors acting on behalf of the respondent virtually unlimited licence to enter any 
place, including private abodes, where they suspected medicines to be, and subsequent to 
which, to inspect documents, including the most intimate of ones.208 Secondly there must be 
prior authorisation by an independent authority in the form of a search warrant unless the 
object of the search will be hampered by the delay occasioned by the process of obtaining a 
search warrant.209 Such prior authorisation is aimed at providing an opportunity, before the 
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event, for the conflicting interests of the State and the individual to be assessed, so that the 
individual‘s right to privacy will be breached only where the appropriate standard has been 
met, and the interests of the state are thus demonstrably superior, and such an enquiry must 
be made in an entirely neutral and impartial manner.210 In the Mistry case the Director was 
empowered to authorise a search and seizure and the court accordingly held that the Director 
did not have the neutrality and detachment to assess whether the interests of the individual 
must give way to those of the state. 
3.4 Invasion of privacy 
The invasion of the right to privacy may take two forms firstly, by the unlawful intrusion 
upon the privacy of another,211 that is, where an outsider himself becomes acquainted with 
the individual or his personal affairs.212 Secondly invasion may take the form of the unlawful 
disclosure or publication of private facts,213 in other words where a person acquaints outsiders 
with the individual or his personal affairs which although known to that person, remain 
private.214 It is with the latter form of intrusion that this research is concerned with albeit in 
the form of forced disclosure. 
3.5 Does the lack of privilege infringe on the right to privacy of taxpayers 
utilising the services of non-legal tax advisors? 
Before looking at whether the restriction of privilege to taxpayers who utilise tax 
practitioners in the legal field infringes the right to privacy of those who utilise non-legal tax 
practitioners one ought to look at whether the latter group of taxpayers can lay a valid claim 
to the right. In order for one to make a valid claim to the protection of the privacy provisions, 
one must have a legitimate expectation of privacy, that is, a subjective expectation of privacy 
that is deemed objectively reasonable by society because it helps achieve a valuable good. It 
is therefore reasonable to expect privacy in the inner sanctum or truly personal realm. When 
consulting tax advisors, taxpayers have a subjective expectation that such information as shall 
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pass between them shall be confidential and private. Information on one‘s tax affairs 
invariably contains details that people would like to keep private, for example, the sources of 
their income as well as how and on what they spend such income, because disclosure would 
mean that such details become the subject of public discourse. It can be argued that details 
such as tax planning memoranda, alternatives rejected in tax planning and tax opinions reside 
in the truly personal realm and as such society is inclined to deem such an expectation of 
privacy as objectively reasonable. No one would like to have information about their income 
and expenditure including the specific details to be the subject of public knowledge as this 
has the potential to affect the dignity or autonomy of the individual or corporate entity. 
The restricted application of privilege means that the privacy right of taxpayers utilising the 
services of non-legal tax practitioners is at risk of being infringed in contrast to the position 
of those who use the services of tax attorneys. The forced disclosure of a client‘s tax 
information in the first instance damages the client‘s decision to enter into a confidential 
relationship215 with a tax advisor of his or her choice because it offends the taxpayer‘s right to 
form private loyalties. Secondly such forced disclosure offends the client‘s right to control 
the distribution of personal information. As such privacy is important in order for taxpayers 
to have a meaningful relationship with their advisors and the lack of protection for such a 
relationship infringes on the client‘s right to privacy. 
3.6 The right to equality 
There have been numerous political documents proclaiming the equality of all and among 
them one will find the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The question that has to be 
asked is ―what exactly does equality mean?‖ The South African Constitution has, in its 
foundational values, the aspiration for a state founded on human dignity, the achievement of 
equality, and the advancement of human freedoms and rights.216 According to Currie and De 
Waal, at its most basic and abstract, the formal idea of equality is that people who are 
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similarly situated should be treated similarly.217 In order to give effect to the foundational 
value of equality, section 9 of the Constitution states that: 
(i) Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the 
law. 
(ii) Equality includes full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. To promote the 
achievement of equality, legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance 
persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken. 
(iii) The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or 
more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social 
origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language 
and birth. 
(iv) No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or 
more grounds in terms of subsection (3). National legislation must be enacted to 
prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination. 
(v) Discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in subsection (3) is unfair unless it 
is established that the discrimination is fair. 
As can be seen from the wording of the provision it binds both the state and individuals alike. 
While the first subsection deals with the principle of equality, the second deals with 
affirmative action, whereas the third contains a proscription of unfair discrimination on listed 
grounds and other analogous grounds. The fourth extends the proscription of unfair 
discrimination to the horizontal or private level and the fifth subsection is in the form of a 
presumption that state or private discrimination on listed grounds is unfair.218 The concept of 
equality as contained in the Constitution will be dealt with in more detail later in this chapter. 
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3.7 Context of the right 
It has been said that ―the perennial problem of human beings is their failure to treat others as 
fellow human beings with fairness and justice…from time immemorial people have used all 
sorts of attributes to justify why they should be entitled to more rights and privileges than 
others and why others should be discriminated against with impunity‖.219 In apartheid South 
Africa the political and legal system was based on inequality and discrimination on the basis 
of race,220 and black people were systematically discriminated against in all aspects of social 
life with separate and inferior facilities being provided for them.221 The constitutional 
dispensation came about as a result of rebellion against such a system and the drafters of the 
Constitution and indeed the people of South Africa were driven by a desire never to go back 
to the days of apartheid and thus equality became a prominent theme in the Constitution. 
Post-1994, the government acting in accordance with the Constitution and in light of the 
‗scars‘ of the past, has been engaged in an attempt to overturn inequality in its many 
manifestations. It is in this light that formal equality on its own is inadequate hence there has 
been the need to have substantive equality and the state is obliged by the Constitution to 
promulgate legislation that will ensure that substantive equality is realised. 
3.8 Formal versus substantive equality 
Equality comes in the form of two guises, formal equality as well as substantive equality.  
Formal equality states that people in like circumstances should be treated alike, in other 
words there must be sameness of treatment. According to this approach, inequality can be 
eliminated by extending the same rights and entitlements to all in accordance with the same 
neutral norm and standard of measurement.222 The problem with this approach is that it does 
not take into account the disparities, social and economic, which subsisted during the 
apartheid era. It can be said that this particular approach would only be feasible in a society 
which from the beginning has some form of strict egalitarianism, but then such a society is a 
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utopian figment seeing that people have always strived to put themselves above others 
socially and economically. A purely formalistic approach to equality would, in the South 
African context, risk neglecting the commitment of the Constitution to the creation of a 
society based on equality as it would only perpetuate the injustices of the past by glossing 
over them. This is so because the apartheid system created an unequal system, whose legacy 
still subsists to this day, thus making the pursuit of equality an ongoing process. 
Equality does not mean that people should be treated as identical, eating the same food and 
observing the same cultures.223 Substantive equality, unlike formal equality, requires the law 
to ensure equality of outcome and is prepared to tolerate disparity to achieve this goal.224 
Thus, unlike the former which is more concerned with form, substantive equality requires an 
examination of the actual social and economic conditions of groups and individuals in order 
to determine whether the Constitution‘s commitment to equality is being upheld.225 In light of 
the historical context of the Constitution one can safely say that it is the latter approach which 
should be paramount in the pursuit of an equal society and the Constitutional Court amplified 
this in President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo.226 The President‘s decision to remit 
the prison sentences of among others, mothers of minor children under the age of twelve 
years was challenged by the respondent. The respondent was the father of a minor son under 
the age of twelve and would have qualified for remission, but for the fact that he was the 
father and not the mother of his son who was under the age of twelve years. The court a quo 
had found in favour of the respondent and the matter was taken on appeal. According to 
Goldstone J227  
"There is need to develop a concept of  unfair discrimination  which recognises that, 
although a society which affords each human being equal treatment on the basis of 
equal worth and freedom is our goal, we cannot achieve that goal by insisting upon 
identical treatment in all circumstances before that goal is achieved. Each case 
therefore, will require a careful and thorough understanding of the impact of the 
                                               
223
 CRM Dlamini “Equality or justice? Section 9 of the Constitution revisited—Part II” (2002) 27 (2) Journal for 
Juridical Science 15 at 17. 
224
 Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 233. 
225
 Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 233. 
226
 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC). 
  
62 
 
discriminatory action upon the particular people concerned to determine whether its 
overall impact is one which furthers the constitutional goal of equality or not. A 
classification which is unfair in one context may not necessarily be unfair in a different 
context." 
This approach means that some form of disparity of treatment will have to be tolerated so as 
to further the greater goal of an egalitarian society and each case of discrimination will be 
determined in light of the actual social and economic conditions of groups and individuals. 
Complementary to the pursuit of substantive equality the Constitution introduced an 
additional conception of equality, restitutionary equality.  This can be inferred from section 9 
(2) which obliges the state to enact ―legislative and other measures designed to protect or 
advance persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination‖. 
According to the Constitutional Court in National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v 
Minister of Justice228  
". . . It is insufficient merely to ensure that statutory provisions which have caused the 
unfair discrimination of the past are eliminated. Past unfair discrimination has ongoing 
negative consequences, the continuation of which is not halted immediately when the 
initial causes thereof are eliminated, and unless remedied, may continue for a 
substantial time to come  and even indefinitely. Like justice equality delayed is equality 
denied . . ." 
According to Currie and De Waal the concept of restitutionary equality has come to be 
associated with the political concept of transformation.229 As a result, the state is under a duty 
to ensure that equality is achieved even if it means enacting legislation which favours a 
particular group at the expense of another and this is evidenced by the promulgation of the 
Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act,230 as well as the Broad-
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Based Economic Empowerment Act231 among a raft of legislation aimed at furthering 
transformation. 
3.9 Interpretation of the right 
According to Harksen v Lane,232 an inquiry into the violation involves the following stages: 
(a) Does the challenged law or conduct differentiate between people or categories of 
people? If so, does the differentiation bear a rational connection to a legitimate 
government purpose? If it does not, then there is a violation of section 9 (1). Even if it 
does bear a rational connection, it might nevertheless amount to discrimination. 
(b) Does the differentiation amount to unfair discrimination? This requires a two stage 
approach; 
(c) Does the differentiation amount to discrimination? If it is on a listed ground then 
discrimination will have been established. If it is not on a specified ground, then 
whether or not there is discrimination will depend upon whether, objectively, the 
ground is based on attributes and characteristics that have the potential to impair the 
fundamental human dignity of persons as human beings or to affect them adversely in a 
comparably serious manner. 
(i) If the differentiation amounts to ‗discrimination‘, does it amount to unfair 
discrimination? If it is has been found to have been on a specified ground then 
unfairness will be presumed. If on an unspecified ground unfairness will have to 
be established by the complainant. The test of unfairness focuses primarily on the 
impact of the discrimination on the complainant and others in his or her situation. 
(ii) If the discrimination is found to be unfair then a determination will have to be 
made as to whether the provision can be justified under the limitation clause. 
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According to Currie and De Waal, the first stage  concerns the right to equal treatment and 
equality before the law contained in section 9 (1), testing whether there is a rational 
connection between the differentiation in question and a legitimate governmental purpose 
that it is designed to further or achieve.233 If the answer is in the negative then the law or 
conduct violates section 9 (1) and therefore fails at the first stage.  If the differentiation is 
shown to be rational then the second stage of the inquiry comes into consideration and where 
discrimination is found to be unfair one has to look at whether such unfair discrimination is 
justified under the limitation clause contained in section 36 of the Constitution. It has been 
said that section 9 identifies three ways in which differentiation might occur, that is, firstly 
mere differentiation, unfair discrimination and fair discrimination. It is therefore important 
that before looking at whether the limited application of professional privilege survives the 
equality inquiry one must first distinguish the concepts of differentiation and discrimination 
as contained in the provision.  
3.10 Mere differentiation versus discrimination 
The principle of equality does not require everyone to be treated the same but simply that 
people in the same position from a moral point of view should be treated the same.234It is 
only logical that there will be some differentiation in the treatment of citizens for a variety of 
reasons, thus not every differentiation can amount to unequal treatment. As noted in the 
abovementioned inquiry there is differentiation which does not amount to unfair 
discrimination, that is, mere differentiation. The validity of this form of differentiation is 
tested by the less exacting standard of rationality.235 If such law or conduct denies equal 
protection or benefit of the law or amounts to unequal treatment under the law it will be 
invalid. A law or conduct will violate section 9 (1) if the differentiation does not have a 
legitimate purpose and if there is no rational connection between the differentiation and the 
purpose.  The rationality requirement was illustrated in Prinsloo v van der Linde236 a case 
involving the implementation of the Forest Act237. Under the Act owners of land outside of 
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fire control areas were not obliged to institute fire control measures, but were encouraged to 
do so and one of the ways in which this was done was a presumption of negligence by the 
landowner in respect of fires occurring in ‗non-controlled‘ areas, a presumption which did not 
apply in controlled areas. In coming to a finding the court stated that: 
"in regard to mere differentiation the constitutional state is expected to act in a rational 
manner. It should not regulate in an arbitrary manner or manifest ‗naked preferences‘ 
that serve no legitimate governmental purpose, for that would be inconsistent with the 
rule of law …the purpose of this aspect of equality is, therefore, to ensure that the state 
is bound to function in a rational manner….before it can be said that mere 
differentiation infringes section 9 it must be established that there is no rational 
relationship between the differentiation in question and the government purpose which 
is proffered to validate it. In the absence of such rational relationship the differentiation 
will infringe section 9".238 
Currie and De Waal are of the opinion that the ‗rational connection‘ test is far less exacting 
than the test for the justifiability of a limitation of a right.239 
On the other hand, discrimination as a particular form of differentiation is one which is based 
on illegitimate grounds and the starting point is the list of grounds contained in section 9 (3) 
as well as  analogous grounds, although this list is by no means exhaustive.  Dlamini 
describes the attributes contained in the listed grounds and the analogous grounds as 
―irrelevant accidents in the face of our common humanity‖240 and people should not be 
discriminated against based thereon. Analogous grounds are those attributes or characteristics 
which have the potential to impair the fundamental dignity of persons as human beings or to 
affect them seriously in a comparably serious manner.241 One must take note of a 
fundamental difference between the application of the listed grounds and the analogous 
grounds.  Whereas differentiation on any one of the grounds is prima facie unfair 
discrimination in terms of section 9 (5), differentiation on an analogous ground will have to 
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be proved by the applicant to be unfair discrimination and this will be achieved by showing 
that it impairs the complainant‘s fundamental dignity. 
Although the term ‗discrimination‘ carries pejorative associations it must be noted that not all 
discrimination is unfair. In the case of President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo it 
was held that a Presidential decree remitting the prison sentences of among others, mothers of 
children under the age of twelve  while denying the same to fathers of like aged children, was 
fair. This was because mothers of young children were regarded as particularly vulnerable 
and had been victims of past discrimination in the past and the fathers had historically not 
been subjected to disadvantage. As a result this was deemed to be an instance of fair 
discrimination. 
Unfair discrimination on the other hand is discrimination with an unfair impact on its 
victims.242 According to the Prinsloo v van der Linde case unfair discrimination means 
―treating people differently in a way which impairs their fundamental human dignity as 
human beings who are inherently equal in dignity.‖243 The value of dignity is very central to 
understanding the issue of unfair discrimination. In Harksen v Lane244 the court pronounced 
on factors that need to be taken into account when determining whether discrimination is 
unfair. Firstly one must look at the position of the complainants in society and whether they 
have been victims of past patterns of discrimination. Differential treatment which burdens 
people in a disadvantaged position is more likely to be unfair than burdens placed on those 
who are relatively well-off.245 Secondly one must look at the nature of the discriminating law 
or action and the purpose sought to be achieved by it. The third factor entails looking at the 
extent to which the rights of the complainant have been impaired and whether there has been 
an impairment of his or her fundamental dignity. It must be noted that the list of factors, 
while assisting in giving precision and elaboration to the constitutional test of fairness, is by 
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no means a closed list as more factors may emerge as the equality jurisprudence continues to 
develop.246 
3.11 Is the equality clause infringed by the status quo? 
In looking at whether the limited application of legal professional privilege to only those 
taxpayers approaching tax attorneys while excluding those that approach non-legal tax 
advisors is permissible in terms of the equality clause one has to apply the Harksen test.  It 
has been established that there is differentiation of treatment between taxpayers in terms of 
the professional approached. It has also been established in this chapter that the purported 
purpose is to increase tax compliance and reduce incidents of impermissible tax planning. 
However it must be said that there is no rational link between the differentiation and the 
supposed purpose. Rather than achieving the stated purpose, the differentiation actually 
hinders that because without candour and the security of knowing that communications with 
their tax advisors are privileged; taxpayers are unlikely to disclose all their intentions and tax 
affairs thus making it difficult for the professional to give them proper and sufficient advice 
and where necessary discourage their clients from engaging in activities which might violate 
the Income Tax Act.  
Extending the privilege will actually encourage compliance especially in light of the fraud 
exception rule. Thus, there actually is a rational connection between the purpose intended to 
be achieved and the extension of the privilege. As a result one can safely say that the 
differentiation between taxpayers on the basis of the professional they choose to consult will 
fail at the first stage of the inquiry. The differentiation is therefore in contravention of section 
9 (1) which guarantees equality of treatment and protection of the law. The right to equality is 
central to the Constitution and the pursuit of an egalitarian society is one of the main 
commitments of the Constitution. 
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3.12 Justification of the status quo (non-protection) under the limitations clause 
Because the exercise of rights by one person has the potential of infringing on the rights of 
another it is only logical that rights are not absolute and the rights in the South African 
Constitution are not an exception. According to Currie and De Waal there are boundaries set 
by the rights of others and by important social considerations such as public order, safety, 
health and democratic values.247 In the South African context these boundaries find 
expression in section 36 of the Constitution, a general limitations clause which sets out the 
criteria for the justification of the limitation of rights contained in the Bill of Rights. 
According to the provision: 
(i) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general 
application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account 
all relevant factors, including – 
(a) the nature of the right; 
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation; 
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and  
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
(ii) Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other provision of the Constitution, no 
law may limit any right entrenched in the Bill of Rights. 
This section sets out the inquiry into whether a particular limitation of a right is a justifiable 
infringement. It must be noted however this does not mean that the rights can be limited for 
any reason, rather, there has to be exceptionally strong reason for the limitation, in other 
words, the limitation must serve a purpose that most people would regard as compellingly 
important.248 In addition to the purpose being important, there must be good reason for 
thinking that the restriction would achieve the purpose it is designed to achieve and that there 
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is no other realistically available way in which the purpose can be achieved without 
restricting rights.249 The inquiry is part of the two-stage approach in Bill of Rights litigation, 
the first of which is to determine if a right has been infringed and the section 36 inquiry forms 
the second stage, that is, whether the infringement can be justified as a permissible limitation 
of the right. It must, however, be noted that the approach is not cast in stone and the court 
may in some instances depart from the two-stage approach to avoid having to decide whether 
a right has been infringed.250 However, this approach has been criticised as being tantamount 
to reducing the discussion of the justification of a limitation to a hypothetical exercise with 
no precedential value because, the balancing exercise required by the limitation cannot be 
accurately carried out with only a hypothetical violation of rights.251 Having established in 
the preceding section that there is violation of the rights to privacy and equality by the failure 
to extend the common law concept of privilege to clients who seek the services of non-legal 
tax practitioners, the next section is aimed at determining whether such an infringement is 
justifiable in terms of section 36. As noted above, limitation of a right will only be legitimate 
if it is done by (a) a law of general application that is (b) reasonable and justifiable in an open 
and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom. The following section 
will apply the limitation clause to the subject matter of this research. 
3.12.1 Law of general application 
3.12.1.1               Authorised by law 
The minimum requirement for the limitation of a right is that the infringement must be 
authorised by law and the law must be of general application. This requirement embodies the 
basic principle of liberal political philosophy and constitutional law, that is, the rule of law. 
An infringement must therefore be occasioned by law and in this context ‗law‘ means all 
forms of legislation, whether delegated or original,  the common law, private and public, as 
well as customary law.252 As a result an infringement must be in terms of any of the 
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abovementioned categories of law, if not, then such limitation will not be justified from the 
very first instance. Because the concept of privilege in its present form originates in the 
common law it is submitted that the infringement is authorised by law because the privilege 
is only availed to those seeking the services of legal professionals. 
3.12.1.2 General application 
An infringement must not only be authorised by law, such a law must be of general 
application. At the level of form the law must be sufficiently clear, accessible and precise that 
those affected by it can ascertain the extent of their rights and obligations. At a substantial 
level, at a minimum, the law must apply impersonally, it must apply equally to all and it must 
not be arbitrary in its application.253  The application of this requirement can be seen in the 
case of De Lille v Speaker of the National Assembly254 where Parliamentary privilege had 
been utilised to suspend a Member of Parliament by an ad hoc committee of the National 
Assembly.  This privilege allowed for the suspension of a member for contempt of 
Parliament. It was held that the suspension did not constitute a justifiable infringement on the 
rights to freedom of expression, just administrative action and access to courts because it was 
not authorised by law of general application.255 The privilege was not in accordance with 
equality and was arbitrary because it was not ―codified or capable of ascertainment. Nor is it 
based on a clear system of precedent. There is no guarantee of parity of treatment. It is 
essentially ad hoc jurisprudence which applies unequally to different parties‖.256 
Whereas on the level of form the concept of privilege is sufficiently clear, accessible and 
precise it is on the substantive level that it fails the test. Although it can be said that it applies 
impersonally one cannot say it does so in accordance with equality. As has been shown in 
this chapter, the application of the privilege is unequal because it differentiates between 
clients on the basis of which particular tax professional they choose to approach. Those who 
approach tax attorneys are availed of its protection whereas those who approach non-legal tax 
practitioners are devoid of it protection. In so far as the privilege belongs to the client rather 
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than the professional there is inequality of treatment and since the application of the privilege 
differs on the basis of the professional approached it is submitted that such differentiation of 
treatment is arbitrary and therefore the limitation of the right to privacy and equality is not 
legitimate. As such the limitation fails at the first leg of the limitation inquiry. However it is 
only prudent to explore whether the violation will survive the second leg of the test. 
3.12.2 Reasonableness and justifiability in an open and democratic society 
based on human dignity, equality and freedom 
In order for a limitation to pass this second stage of the inquiry it must be shown that the law 
in question serves a constitutionally acceptable purpose and that there is sufficient 
proportionality between the harm done by the law (infringement of fundamental rights) and 
the benefits it is designed to achieve (the purposes of the law).257 As such there is a need for a 
balancing of interests, that is, the nature of the right that is limited and its importance to an 
open and democratic society based on freedom and equality; the purpose for which the right 
is limited and the importance of that purpose to such a society; the extent of the limitation, its 
efficacy, and particularly where the limitation has to be necessary, whether the desired ends 
could reasonably be achieved through other means less damaging to the right in question.258 
3.12.2.1 Nature of the rights to privacy and equality 
The nature of the rights to privacy and equality in the South African constitutional scheme 
cannot be overemphasised. They are crucial to the enjoyment of other rights especially the 
right to dignity which is also a foundational value of the Constitution. This is more so in light 
of South African history where privacy and equality and consequently human dignity were 
wantonly disregarded by the state. These rights are of particular importance to the 
Constitution‘s aim of creating an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom. Thus it has to take some exceptional reason to justify their limitation. 
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3.12.2.2 The purpose of the limitation and importance to society 
The purpose for the non-protection afforded to taxpayers who approach non-legal tax 
practitioners can only be explained as aimed at using compulsion as a means of regulating 
and enforcing compliance. It is beyond debate that tax compliance is important because it 
ensures that taxpayers accordingly contribute to the fiscus so that the State has revenue from 
which it can fund government activities as well as service delivery. As a result it is 
worthwhile and important in a constitutional democracy that tax legislation and regulations 
are complied with. 
3.12.2.3 The extent of the limitation and its efficacy 
The limitation in question is a serious infringement of the rights to privacy and equality of 
those taxpayers who approach non-legal tax practitioners because their information is at risk 
of being obtained by the state through compulsion of the client and his or her advisor. It can 
be submitted however that this limitation is not effective in achieving the required purpose 
because rather than encouraging compliance it actually pushes non-compliance underground 
and thus more resources are being expended to investigate cases of non-compliance. Should 
protection be afforded to all taxpayers regardless of the professional they approach, the 
purpose purportedly behind the limitation would actually be more achievable because it is 
only when all information is put before the practitioner that he can effectively advise his 
client and actually ensure that any tax planning activities are done within the law. In some 
instances the non-compliance occurs because the client is not given the appropriate advice 
because he or she does not disclose all particulars of their tax affairs for fear that such 
information will be disclosed through compulsion. It is submitted that tax practitioners like 
any other professionals have an obligation to advise their clients to conduct their affairs in a 
legal manner and privilege will enhance this because it encourages full and frank disclosure.  
3.12.2.4 Less restrictive means of achieving the purpose 
As shown above there is a less restrictive way of ensuring compliance with tax legislation 
and that involves encouraging candour between the taxpayer and the tax practitioner in much 
the same way disclosure between a attorney and his client is fostered. This ensures that the 
  
73 
 
taxpayer is given adequate and lawful advice thus ensuring that compliance actually 
increases. The purpose purportedly aimed at by the limitation will also be achieved due to the 
fraud exception contained in the privilege. As a result, where advice is obtained or given in 
furtherance of a fraud or contravention of the tax legislation the protection is stripped away 
and the information is available to be obtained by the taxation authorities. The fraud 
exception will actually act as a deterrent against non-compliance and impermissible tax 
planning because taxpayers and tax practitioners will be aware that in the event of such 
actions the protection afforded by the privilege will fall away. The fact that the privilege can 
be waived, expressly, impliedly and even imputedly will also act as a deterrence thus actually 
enhancing tax compliance. As a result there is another way in which the purpose may be 
achieved without necessarily involving the violation of fundamental rights.  
3.12.3 Is the infringement of the rights justified? 
As a result it can be said that not only is the infringement of the rights to privacy and equality 
in this instance not in terms of a law of general application, it also fails the second test 
because there is no proportionality between the infringement of the rights and the purpose 
which it aims to achieve. The rights violated are ones which are central to the enjoyment of 
other rights and whereas the purpose sought to be achieved is an important one, the 
relationship between the infringement and the purpose is tenuous and inefficient and there is 
another more efficient way which is proportionally linked to the purpose and does not 
necessarily involve the violation of fundamental rights. In actual fact the alternative approach 
furthers the purpose and has inbuilt safeguards aimed at achieving the desired end, tax 
compliance. 
3.13 How is the situation to be remedied? 
As has been shown above the status quo, that is, the denial of privilege to those taxpayers 
who utilise the services of non-legal tax practitioners while the same is afforded to those 
using the services of tax attorneys, will not pass constitutional muster as it violates both the 
privacy and equality rights of the Constitution. Since the current position is untenable in light 
of the Constitution, there are two possible ways in which the problem could be remedied. 
Firstly, the privilege can be abolished when attorneys deal with tax matters. The second 
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option entails having the privilege extended to non-legal tax practitioners in a qualified 
manner. 
The first option entails withdrawing privilege from attorneys when they perform the same 
services as non-legal tax practitioners. This would be tantamount to delineating the 
application of the privilege on functional lines. This particular argument is based on the 
argument that privilege should only be restricted to those functions which are traditionally 
called legal. One of the problems with this approach however is that finding functions 
peculiarly within the province of the conscientious attorney would be frustrating if not 
impossible.259 It must also be noted that although resulting in equality of treatment this 
approach would not necessarily further the purpose of the information provisions in the 
Income Tax Act. Devoid of the protection afforded by privilege taxpayers are more likely to 
keep some information from their advisors, legal and non-legal, thus hindering the giving of 
sufficient and appropriate advice. In fact such an approach will work directly against tax 
compliance measures. 
The alternative would be to extend the privilege to cover non-legal tax advisors. This seems 
to be the more tenable approach especially in light of the fact that the privilege belongs to the 
client, in this case the taxpayer, and not the professional being approached for advice. The 
privilege may be extended to non-legal tax practitioners with a slight adaptation of the 
requirements of privilege as proposed in chapter two of this discussion. This would mean 
restricting the application of the privilege to matters which are of a purely taxation nature 
when such information is obtained from a non-legal tax practitioners. As will be seen in the 
next chapter some jurisdictions have extended the concept of privilege to include non-legal 
tax practitioners and new concepts have been introduced, for example, the ‗work product 
doctrine‘ in the United States of America. Other jurisdictions have stated that the preparation 
of tax returns does not amount to the obtaining of tax advice for the purposes of privilege 
thus restricting the ambit of the privilege to those instances where one obtains advice 
pertaining to tax and estate planning. This approach will actually have the effect of increasing 
candour and consequently tax compliance as advisors will be in a position to give proper and 
sufficient advice. 
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3.14 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the constitutional principles of privacy and equality have been explored. It has 
been shown that these rights are fundamental to the South African constitutional dispensation 
and there has been a great deal of case law on the matter. It is clear that all taxpayers by 
virtue of being human beings are entitled to the protection of these rights and the denial of the 
privilege to taxpayers approaching non-legal tax advisors while affording the same to those 
obtaining advice from tax attorneys infringes these rights. Such infringements have been 
shown to be unjustifiable in an open and democratic society based on the values of freedom, 
equality and dignity. Having established that the differentiation of treatment is in 
contravention of the Constitution, possible alternatives, namely withdrawal of privilege from 
attorneys when dealing with tax matters as well as the extension of the doctrine have been 
discussed. While the former will result in a form of formal equality it is the latter which is 
more desirable as it not only results in equality and protection of the right to privacy, it also 
furthers the governmental purpose of regulating and enforcing tax compliance. The next 
chapter will explore how other jurisdictions, namely, the United States of America, Australia 
and New Zealand have extended the concept of privilege to non-legal tax advisors.
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4 CHAPTER 4: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
4.1 Introduction 
In preceding chapters the concept of legal professional privilege was explored and the 
differentiation in treatment between taxpayers who utilise tax attorneys and those utilising 
non-legal tax advisors was found to be unconstitutional. Having established that the current 
approach is untenable under the South African Constitution, this chapter will look at possible 
ways of extending legal professional privilege to non-legal tax practitioners thus bringing the 
situation into compliance with the Constitution.  In 1998 the United States of America, under 
President Bill Clinton, introduced the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform 
Act which contained section 7525 which introduced a statutory privilege based on the 
common law privilege. In 2005 New Zealand followed suit when the legislature introduced 
sections 20B to 20D into the income tax legislation when they enacted the Taxation (Base 
Maintenance and Miscellaneous) Act.  This created a statutory privilege independent of the 
common law. The Australian Law Reform Commission in its Report on Client Legal 
Privilege in Federal Investigations has recommended the extension of privilege to federal 
bodies which have coercive powers and the Australian Tax Office is one such body to which 
the recommendations apply. In the case of Prudential v Special Commissioner of Taxes260 the 
Court of Appeal in England refused to extend the privilege, thus leaving the exercise to the 
legislature. The present chapter of this thesis will discuss the American approach and the 
approach adopted by New Zealand, before discussing the recommendations of the Australian 
Law Reform Commission, as well as a brief consideration of the English position. 
4.2 The American approach 
Prior to the promulgation of section 7525, although only attorney client privilege applied, the 
Internal Revenue Service (hereafter referred to as the IRS) granted parity to attorneys, 
certified public accountants as well as enrolled agents in their dealings with the IRS. 
Accordingly it was argued that since the various groups of professionals represented 
taxpayers before the IRS in the same manner as attorneys, taxpayers should enjoy the same 
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special status of privileged communications when dealing with their non-legal tax advisors.261 
As noted above, in 1998 the United States introduced a tax practitioner privilege through 
section 7525 of the Internal Revenue Code, better known as the Federally Approved Tax 
Practitioner Privilege (or FATP for short). The promulgation of section 7525 was motivated 
by a need to provide equal protection of tax advice from coerced disclosure regardless of 
whether it was rendered to a taxpayer by a attorney or accountant.262 According to Joyce263 
there were three primary reasons that were cited by the United States Congress for enacting 
the privilege. Firstly, there was a need to respond to aggressive behaviour by the IRS in 
engaging in ―financial status or lifestyle auditing‖, secondly Congress was concerned with 
the competitive atmosphere between the two primary tax practitioner groups, accounting and 
law firms, as well as the desire not to penalize taxpayers, pertaining to confidentiality of 
communications, simply because of the professional classification of the advisor. 
4.2.1 Federally approved tax practitioner privilege (section 7525) 
Section 7525 extends privilege thus: 
(a). Uniform application to taxpayer communications with federally authorized 
practitioners. 
(1) General rule 
With respect to tax advice, the same common law protections of confidentiality which 
apply to a communication between a taxpayer and an attorney shall also apply to a 
communication between a taxpayer and any federally authorized tax practitioner to the 
extent the communication would be considered a privileged communication if it were 
between a taxpayer and an attorney. 
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(2)  Limitations 
Paragraph (1) may only be asserted in: 
(a) any non-criminal tax matter before the Internal Revenue Service; and 
(b) any non-criminal tax proceeding in federal court brought by or against the United 
States. 
(3) Definitions 
For purposes of this subsection: 
A Federally authorized tax practitioner. 
The term ―federally authorized tax practitioner‖ means any individual who is 
authorized under Federal law to practice before the Internal Revenue Service if 
such practice is subject to Federal regulation under section 330 of title 31, United 
States Code. 
B. Tax advice 
The term ―tax advice‖ means advice given by an individual with respect to a 
matter which is within the scope of the individual‘s authority to practice 
described in subparagraph (A) 
(b) Section not to apply to communications regarding tax shelters 
The privilege under subsection (a) shall not apply to any written communication which 
is: 
(1) between a federally authorized tax practitioner and: 
(a) any person, 
(b) any other person holding a capital or profits interest in the person, and 
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(c) any director, officer, employee, agent, or representative of the person, or  
(2) in connection with the promotion of the direct or indirect participation of the 
person in any tax shelter (as defined in section 6662 (d) (2) (C) (ii)) 
From the wording of subsection (a) (1) it is clear that any communication with a non-legal tax 
practitioner will only be protected in terms of section 7525 to the extent that such 
communication would have been protected had it been made with an attorney.264 The section 
7525 privilege is therefore no greater than the attorney-client privilege. Other subsections of 
the provision are aimed at limiting the application of the privilege such that it is narrower 
than attorney-client privilege. Firstly subsection (a) (2) contains a list of limitations which 
state that the privilege may only be asserted in non-criminal matters before the IRS and the 
Federal court brought by or against the United States. This means that the privilege may not 
be asserted against any other federal or state agencies or to state tax litigation.265 In addition 
the privilege is only applicable where the professional concerned is a federally authorized tax 
practitioner and this restricts the ambit of the professionals to whom the privilege may apply.  
The section does not apply in instances where the communication is in regard to the 
promotion of tax shelters. The scope of the section is analysed in more detail below. 
4.2.2 Scope of the American approach 
As noted above the section only applies in instances where tax advice is rendered by a 
federally authorised tax advisor and may be asserted in non-criminal matters before the IRS 
and in proceedings before federal court brought by or against the United States. As a 
consequence this means that the privilege does not apply to any private litigation, criminal 
proceedings, civil proceedings where written communications relating to tax shelters are 
relevant, or in state tax proceedings.266 While the wording of the other subsections is clear, it 
is the last two subsections, that is, the definition of tax advice as well as the tax shelter 
exception to the privilege that have attracted comment in case law. 
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According to the statute ―tax advice‖ is defined as advice given by an individual with respect 
to a matter which is within the scope of the individual‘s authority to practice in terms of 
Federal authorisation.  According to Joyce the problem with this definition is that it would 
include any tax aspect of any matter, even if the tax portion of any matter were very slight in 
comparison to the matter as a whole.267 It is not easy to distinguish ―tax advice‖ from general 
business or accounting advice and it is not clear when tax advice becomes business advice 
that is not covered by the privilege.268 In United States v Frederick269 it was held that where a 
document or advice had been given for a dual purpose, one of which is subject to privilege 
such document or information as a whole is not privileged under section 7525. Such 
communication will violate subsection (a) (1) because if rendered to or by an attorney such 
information would not be privileged because it will fail the ―for the purpose of obtaining 
legal advice‖ aspect of the common law concept of privilege and will thus be devoid of 
protection. As such, where it can be shown that a part of the advice does not fall under the 
ambit of the section, the whole communication is not privileged and this is unlike the 
common law approach where the privileged parts or aspects are excised thus leaving to 
discovery those aspects which do not qualify for protection. The court also pointed out that 
information furnished for the preparing of a tax return is not privileged because it is not 
furnished for the preparation of a brief or an opinion.270 A tax return is prepared for onward 
furnishing to the IRS in any case so it would be redundant to protect such information by way 
of privilege. 
Another aspect of the section which has attracted judicial comment is the tax shelter 
exception contained in subsection (b). This provision is similar to the fraud exception rule of 
the common law attorney-client privilege. According to the provision, section 7525 privilege 
does not apply to any written communication which is between a federally authorized tax 
practitioner and any person, director, officer, employee, agent, or representative of the person 
or any other person holding a capital or profits interest in the person, in connection with the 
promotion of the direct or indirect participation of the person in any tax shelter. As such there 
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must be a written communication and that communication must be in connection with the 
promotion of a corporations‘ participation in a tax shelter. A tax shelter is defined as a 
partnership, entity, plan or arrangement a significant purpose of which is the avoidance or 
evasion of federal income tax.271 In Countryside Ltd. Partnership et al. v Commissioner272 the 
court was called upon to decide whether the tax shelter exception applied and one of the main 
issues in contention was whether there had been a written communication. In the case the IRS 
had filed motions to compel the production of written minutes which memorialized 
communications between the partnership, its attorney and its Federally Authorized Tax 
Practitioner.  During the meeting one of the partners made handwritten notes and it was these 
that the IRS sought to be produced. The IRS in order to invoke the exception had to prove 
that the abovementioned requirements were met. It was argued by counsel for the partnership 
that the term written communication requires some form of transmission of written material 
from one person to another.273 In coming to a conclusion that the exception did not apply the 
court referred to United States v BDO Seidman274 where it was held that ―because the 
exception applies to written communications, oral communications between tax practitioner 
and the corporate agent remain within the general rule of privilege‖. Consequently the court 
came to the finding that the notes were the mere recording of an oral conversation and were 
not communicated to anyone,275 thus the ―written communication‖ requirement of the 
exception was not met and the communication remained privileged. 
Another aspect of the exception which attracted mention is the ―promotion of a tax shelter‖ 
requirement. In order for the exception to be successfully invoked it must be shown that the 
communication was aimed at promoting the direct or indirect participation of a corporation in 
an arrangement or plan whose sole aim is the avoidance or evasion of income tax, essentially 
similar to the impermissible tax planning provisions of the South African Income Tax Act. 
The court was called upon in United States v Textron276 as well as Countryside Partnership to 
determine whether the actions of the respective tax advisors amounted to the promotion of a 
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tax shelter. In Textron the court stated that section 7525 was aimed at communications by 
outside tax practitioners attempting to sell tax shelters to a corporate client because the 
promotion of tax shelters does not fall within the routine relationship between a tax 
practitioner and a client.277 The court held that Textron‘s accountants were not outside 
promoters soliciting the client‘s participation in a tax shelter, rather they were acting as tax 
advisors and the communications in question were a reflection of their opinions regarding 
foreseeable tax consequences of transactions that had already taken place, not future 
transactions they were seeking to promote.278 In Countryside Partnership279 it was held that 
the advice given by the practitioner was furnished as part of a long-standing, ongoing and 
hence routine relationship between a Federally Authorised Tax Practitioner and his client and 
thus did not constitute the promotion of a tax shelter. It must be noted however that the court 
did concede that there may be a point at which a Federally Authorised Tax Practitioner‘s 
actions cross the line and will no longer be encompassed within the routine relationship 
between a tax practitioner and his client and will amount to tax shelter promotion. 
It must be noted that the common law conditions under which the attorney-client privilege is 
waived apply with equal force to the section 7525 privilege.280 This means that only the client 
may waive the privilege, either expressly, impliedly or imputedly. As such communications 
contained in a tax return are not privileged as they are prepared for the IRS. 
4.2.3 Criticism of section 7525 
A glaring shortcoming of the section 7525 privilege is to be found in the fact that it only 
applies to matters at the federal level.  This means that it does not apply to state tax issues or 
state tax proceedings. As a result the privilege may be easily circumvented in the event that 
state tax issues or proceedings become a matter of public record. The same also applies to 
private litigation as the privilege does not extend to civil matters between private litigants. 
This has the effect of rendering the privilege redundant when it comes to matters that would 
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have been addressed at state level and brought on appeal to the federal level. Some states, 
such as California, promulgated their own legislation which extends the privilege to state 
proceedings in order to counter this.281 The fact that the operation of the privilege is restricted 
to proceedings before the IRS means that communications between a tax advisor and a 
taxpayer made in preparation for proceedings before other statutory bodies such as the 
Franchise Tax Board of California and other like bodies in other states would be discoverable 
by the IRS through information sharing.282 This has the potential of rendering the privilege 
redundant in the event that the IRS obtains such information. 
According to Joyce283 the application of the privilege to non-criminal matters and 
proceedings only, can lead to great difficulties as many controversies often start out as civil 
matters before becoming criminal matters. As such the problem with subsection (a) (2) is not 
so much that it does not extend to criminal matters, rather that the problem is in determining 
at what point an ordinary matter becomes a criminal matter284 and what happens to 
information that would have passed between client and advisor before the matter became a 
criminal one. It has been stated that the information in the pre-criminal stage will not be 
privileged because the IRS may be able to strip away privilege retroactively back to the 
beginning of the matter before the parties discerned any possibility of a criminal inquiry.285 
This particular aspect poses a serious risk to the taxpayer because clients may not be aware 
that communications relating to non-criminal matters made privileged and confidential 
pursuant to section 7525 lose protection once the matter converts to a criminal one.286 The 
section is aimed at giving taxpayers the same protection of privacy regardless of the tax 
advisor selected, but as the situation currently stands, a client who approaches an attorney 
does not have to worry about losing the protection of the privilege should the matter become 
a criminal one while this is a pitfall awaiting those who utilise the services of non-legal tax 
practitioners. 
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The definition of tax advice in the provision is also problematic. As noted in the Frederick 
case any dual purpose documents, where one purpose was the obtaining of tax advice while 
the other is for another purpose such as legal advice, are not protected by privilege.287 This 
contradicts the assertion that the privilege is aimed at putting taxpayers at parity regardless of 
who they approach for professional advice because such communications when made to a 
attorney, especially when the other purpose is for legal advice, are privileged. From the 
Frederick case it seems that the moment a part of communications is deemed to be not tax-
related then privilege falls away. According to Kaplan,288 however, the Frederick finding 
may not apply if the taxpayer can show that the communication is severable in whole or in 
part between its privileged and non-privileged subject matters. The above deficiencies in the 
privilege have tempted some to argue that the current limitations and  inherent pitfalls found 
within section 7525 may lead one to eventually question whether the taxpayer is better off 
without the privilege than with it.289 
4.3 The New Zealand approach 
In June 2005 the New Zealand legislature brought to fruition a process set in motion by the 
1954 Court of Appeal‘s judgment in Commissioner for Inland Revenue v West-Walker290. It 
was the court‘s finding that the information gathering powers of the Commissioner for Inland 
Revenue operated subject to legal professional privilege. The decision was incorporated into 
section 16A of the Inland Revenue Department Act 1952 of 1958. In 1994 this provision was 
replaced by section 20 of the Tax Administration Act of 1994. However these particular 
provisions only applied to information rendered by legal advisors with regard to tax law. To 
remedy the situation and ensure that tax advice rendered by non-legal tax practitioners was 
also protected, consultations were held and the central recommendation emerging from the 
process was for the replacement of section 20 of the Tax Administration Act of 1994 with ―a 
new and complete code for tax and privilege‖291. This culminated in the creation of a 
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statutory non-disclosure right for tax advisors in terms of section 20B, which although similar 
to legal professional privilege, is not governed by identical rules.292 The nature of the non-
disclosure right was explored in Blakeley v Commissioner of Inland Revenue293  and the court 
confirmed that the right is completely separate from the common law privilege, as opposed to 
section 7525 of the Internal Revenue Code referred to above which is in effect an extension, 
albeit limited, of the common law legal professional privilege.  The nature of the privilege is 
in accordance with the purpose of the legislature which was to provide a degree of 
consistency rather than equality of treatment in par with legal professional privilege.294 
According to the provision,295 a book or document is eligible to be tax advice and thereby 
potentially eligible for protection from disclosure if: 
(a) it is confidential; and  
(b) it is created: 
(i) by the taxpayer for the main purpose of instructing a tax advisor so that the tax 
advisor can provide advice about the operation and effect of tax laws; or 
 
(ii) by the tax advisor for the main purpose of recording research or analysis that is to 
be used in providing advice to the taxpayer about the operation and effect of tax 
laws; or  
 
(iii) by the  tax advisor for the main purpose of giving advice or recording advice 
given to the taxpayer where the advice is about the operation and effect of tax 
laws; and 
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(c) the purpose for which the book or document were created do not include committing or 
promoting the commission of an illegal or wrongful act. 
Section 20D goes on to set out the procedure for claiming the right once eligibility for 
protection under section 20B has been established. The prescribed procedure differs 
depending on whether the book or document has been prepared by the tax advisor or by the 
taxpayer. Where the tax advice document has been prepared or created by the tax advisor 
section 20D prescribes that the claim must set out the following information: 
(a) a brief description of the form and contents of the document; 
(b) the name of the tax advisor who created the document; 
(c) the approved advisor group to which the tax advisor belonged when creating the 
document; 
(d) the areas of law about which the tax advisor was intending to give advice when creating 
the document; and 
(e) the date on which the document was created. 
When dealing with documents created by the taxpayer, items (c) and (d) do not apply. 
Regardless of eligibility, the right will only be available if claimed within the time limit 
applicable to the context in which the claim arises, failing which the right falls away 
permanently and the taxpayer cannot later assert the non-disclosure right with regard to the 
document even if it is the subject of a different subsequent request for information.296 Section 
20E and 20F set out information or documents that must, despite non-disclosure right 
protection, be disclosed and in this ambit is included ―tax contextual information‖ which is 
defined as: 
(a) a fact or assumption relating to a transaction; 
(b) a description of a step involved in a transaction;  
(c) advice  that does not deal with the operation and effect of tax laws on the  taxpayer 
(other than those tax laws relating to the collection of tax debts); 
  
87 
 
(d) a fact or assumption relating to advice referred to in (c); or, 
(e) a fact or assumption relating to the preparation of the taxpayer‘s financial statements or 
a document that the taxpayer is required to disclose to the commissioner under a tax 
statute. 
Just as in all jurisdictions the Commissioner has the right to challenge a claim for non-
disclosure by applying for a ruling from the District Court and this may include a request for 
more specific tax contextual information.297 
4.3.1 Scope of the New Zealand approach 
As the particular provision was drafted after the promulgation of section 7525, it is evident 
that the legislature sought to avoid some of the apparent shortcomings of the American 
formulation of tax advisor privilege. However it must be noted that the privilege is very 
limited in scope. In the first instance, unlike section 7525, section 20B is precise as to what 
advice is sought to be protected, that is by expressly stating that for a document to be a tax 
advice document it must satisfy the requirements of section 20B (2). This is evidence of the 
limited scope of the non-disclosure right because legal professional privilege covers all 
documents which might be claimed by the revenue authorities, whereas the right only 
protects books and documents. Secondly a claim for non-disclosure protection must be made 
within stipulated time limits and thirdly the person claiming protection must disclose tax 
contextual information from the tax document as well as any attachments.298  Just like the 
common law formulation of privilege the non-disclosure right excludes documents created 
for the purpose of committing or promoting or assisting the commission of an illegal or 
wrongful act. This is the equivalent of the fraud exception rule of the legal professional 
privilege. This means therefore that documents created in the furtherance of tax evasion or 
some other illegal or quasi illegal act such as fraud will not qualify for protection.299 The 
express exclusion of documents created for the purpose of furthering ―wrongful acts‖ means 
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that documents aimed at or that promote tax avoidance are also excluded from the ambit of 
the protection. Unlike tax evasion, tax avoidance is not illegal; although it is often within the 
letter of the law it is against the spirit of the law.300  As noted above the legislature sought to 
avoid the potential pitfalls of section 7525 so they did not include the limitations found in the 
former. As a result the right applies even to criminal proceedings and according to Kendall301 
this can be explained in part by the fact that the majority of offences under New Zealand 
income tax law are civil offences whereas in the American context criminal offences are 
more common. Another important difference from section 7525 is that, whereas section 7525 
only applies against the IRS, the New Zealand non-disclosure right applies generally and not 
only to the Inland Revenue Department.302 This means that once a document is protected by 
the non-disclosure right, the right operates against anyone seeking the disclosure of the 
document and thus there is no compulsory waiver occasioned by limitations such as those 
contained in section 7525. However, it must be noted, that failure to claim the right within the 
stipulated time limits will result in the compulsory permanent waiver of any claim to the right 
whatsoever.  
4.3.2 Criticism of the New Zealand approach 
In its drafting of the non-disclosure right the New Zealand legislature managed to avoid a 
number of the problems associated with the United States‘ section 7525 privilege but, by 
creating a privilege completely separate from its common law counterpart, they created a 
number of potential issues303 that might militate against such a move for other jurisdictions 
seeking to extend privilege to non-legal tax advisors.  Looking at the positive aspects to be 
derived from the non-disclosure right, firstly the statute is clear as to what ―tax advisor‖ 
means in the context.  A tax advisor is defined as a natural person who is subject to the code 
of conduct and disciplinary processes of an approved advisor group. This is an indication that 
the rules may be imputed with public protection in purpose, that is, taxpayers may receive the 
benefit of the protection of their communications with their advisors only if they deal with an 
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advisor who is appropriately qualified and there is no requirement that such groups be limited 
to professional accounting bodies.304 Another important aspect is the fact that there is no 
exclusion of communications in criminal matters, as well as the fact that the privilege, once 
claimed, subsists against any counterparty and not just the Internal Revenue Department.  As 
a result, in terms of the aspects stated above, the statute is an improvement on section 7525.  
As noted above, despite the avoidance of many of the potential problems of section 7525, the 
New Zealand non-disclosure right creates even more potential problems than are bound to 
arise in the former. The creation of a statutory privilege separate from the common law is 
problematic in that attempting to replicate the effect of the common law through language 
adopted by statute, leaves room for the interpretation of the statute in a manner which the 
legislature would not have contemplated, thus creating differences between the common law 
privilege and the statutory privilege.305 Moreover, whereas developments in the common law 
attorney-client privilege will automatically be incorporated into a privilege based in common 
law privilege, such developments are bound not to affect the statutory privilege thus resulting 
in disparity.306 In order to keep up with the developments in the common law the non-
disclosure right will therefore need to be updated by way of regular specific statutory 
amendment, a situation which is tenuous taking into account the slow nature of legislative 
processes. In order to avoid such a situation the creation of a statutory provision broader than 
the common law privilege might be necessary but it must be submitted that the common law 
privilege is sufficient in its coverage of the communications it protects. 
The creation of a statutory privilege separate from the common law privilege means that the 
legislature is in control of the content of the statute and this presents problems of 
interpretation. A privilege grounded in the common law privilege will have the benefit of 
decades-long precedent and tax advisors can anticipate a court‘s interpretation of the new 
privilege whereas any uncertainties emanating from an independent rule will be much more 
difficult to resolve in the absence of judicial interpretation.307 
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It must also be noted that when it comes to the non-disclosure right it must be claimed in 
accordance with a prescribed procedure the equivalent of which is non-existent when it 
comes to legal professional privilege. This process imposes additional compliance costs on 
the taxpayer as well as the tax advisor, especially in cases where a number of documents are 
subject to demand by the revenue authorities.308 In terms of the common law, privilege 
attaches as soon as the requirements are met and subsists until waived by the client.309 In 
addition, whereas tax contextual information is not protected and must be availed to the 
revenue authorities, such information would be protected under legal professional privilege. 
Furthermore the New Zealand approach does not achieve parity. In all fairness to the 
legislature, parity with legal advice was not an intended goal in creating the statute, their goal 
was the establishment of some level of consistency rather than putting clients of non-legal tax 
advisors at par with their counterparts who utilise the services of tax attorneys.  
4.4 The proposed Australian approach 
In December of 2007 the Australian Law Reform Commission released its report on client-
legal privilege in federal investigations. It recommended the creation of a statute of general 
application to cover various aspects of the law and procedure governing client legal privilege 
claims in federal investigations and among the bodies targeted is the Australian 
Commissioner of Taxes.310 In terms of recommendation 6-6 the Commission proposed the 
extension of the privilege to tax agents, a proposal met by fierce resistance from the 
Australian Law Council311 which claims that there is no historical or institutional basis for 
extending privilege to tax advisors. In terms of recommendation 6-6 the privilege should 
provide that a person who is required to disclose information under a coercive gathering 
power of the Commissioner of Taxation is not required to disclose a document that is a tax 
advice document prepared for that person. A ‗tax advice document‘ is defined as a 
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confidential document created by an independent professional accounting advisor for the 
dominant purpose of providing that person with advice about the operation and effect of tax 
laws.312 This definition is problematic because it postulates that the advice must be rendered 
by an accounting advisor who is registered as a tax agent. It is not clear therefore whether it is 
a prerequisite that one must be admitted as an accountant before the privilege can apply.  
According to Maples313 the statutory right proposed by the Law Reform Commission is not 
dissimilar to the statutory right promulgated in New Zealand. Up to the present, the 
Australian legislature has not acted on the recommendations and it remains to be seen which 
route will be taken, whether the legislation will be grounded in the common law or will be 
separate from and independent of the common law. The approach to be taken will most likely 
be influenced by the problems encountered by the two jurisdictions which have adopted two 
divergent approaches in extending the privilege, the United States of America and New 
Zealand. 
4.5 The position in England 
England has also had to look into the question whether it will be prudent to extend legal 
professional privilege to clients of non-legal tax practitioners. Up until recently, not much 
attention was paid to the question until the case of Prudential v HM Revenue and 
Customs314came before the High Court. Prudential had claimed that tax advice it had received 
from a firm of chartered accountants was protected by legal professional privilege.  The High 
Court held that when seeking tax advice, privilege only covered the clients of attorneys and 
not the clients of accountants. The matter was taken up on appeal but the Court of Appeal 
upheld the finding of the High Court in a decision which has been labelled by accounting 
bodies as being contrary to the public interest.315 It was the court‘s reasoning that it was 
bound by precedent to find that the privilege was only available to attorneys and not 
accountants. The decision was welcomed by the Law Society which was of the opinion that 
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―the decision was reassuring for clients and solicitors . . . if the privilege is to be extended 
beyond the advice of the legal professionals it must done via a statute that clearly defines the 
limits and conditions of any extension both as to the areas of law or the professional advisor 
to ensure certainty as to the scope of its application.‖316  
While the decision is understandably disheartening from the point of view of non-legal tax 
advisors in England, it must be noted that all the jurisdictions that have extended the privilege 
to non-legal tax practitioners have done so through legislative intervention and not judicial 
activism. While the courts have powers to develop the common law, the far reaching 
consequences of the extension to non-legal tax advisors demand that this be done by the 
legislature rather than the courts. 
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter sought to explore how other jurisdictions have approached the question of 
extending legal professional privilege to non-legal tax practitioners. As has been shown the 
approaches taken by the various jurisdictions differ. The United States of America created a 
statutory privilege through section 7525 of the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and 
Reform Act. The privilege is grounded in the common law, with the result that any 
developments in the common law will also be reflected in the statutory privilege. As has been 
shown, however, there are shortcomings to section 7525, particularly the limitations which 
militate against the effective operation of the privilege. The second approach is that which is 
embodied in section 20B to 20G of the Taxation (Base Maintenance and Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act promulgated in New Zealand. This approach is independent of the common 
law and the main problem with this is that it is arduous to amend because any developments 
in the common law will not automatically apply to the statute, rather the Act will have to be 
amended by parliament whenever there is a need to develop it. Another fault is that there is 
scope for the misinterpretation of the Act as there is no precedent to rely on. The statute, 
however, manages to avoid some of the problems associated with section 7525 particularly 
when it comes to definitions of ―tax advice‖ as well as ―tax advisor‖. It was also noted that 
the proposed Australian approach is more or less along the lines of section 20B to 20G and 
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since the recommendations of the Australian Law Reform Commission are yet to be 
implemented one can only wait and see which route the legislature will take. The English 
courts have tended to follow precedent and thus the privilege has been held not to apply to 
non-legal tax practitioners and, in keeping with the Westminster tradition have deferred to 
parliament which is sovereign.  
The following chapter will seek to conclude this discussion and make recommendations with 
regard to the approach to be followed by the South African legislature.  
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5 CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
5.1 Goals of the research 
The research was aimed at showing firstly that the rationale, nature and the requirements of 
legal professional privilege are amenable to extension to non-legal tax practitioners. 
Secondly, the research aimed to show that the current situation where taxpayers who obtain 
advice from non-legal practitioners are not covered by privilege while those who approach 
tax attorneys are, does not pass constitutional muster. The third goal was to explore ways in 
which this can be corrected by drawing from the experiences of those jurisdictions which 
have extended legal professional privilege to cover non-legal tax practitioners, namely, the 
United States of America and New Zealand. The following sections will show how each of 
the abovementioned goals has been achieved. 
5.2 Constitutionality of the current position 
As has been shown in the discussion the privacy and equality rights of taxpayers who utilise 
the services of non-legal tax practitioners are infringed by the denial of privilege as opposed 
to those who obtain advice from attorneys. The right to privacy is infringed because there is a 
legitimate expectation that confidential information such as tax planning memoranda, 
alternatives rejected in planning and tax opinions should be protected.  
The right to equality is also infringed by the continued denial of legal privilege. Although this 
does not constitute unfair discrimination on the listed or analogous grounds, it constitutes 
differentiation and in order for such differentiation to be legitimate there must be a rational 
connection between the differentiation and a legitimate governmental purpose. The stated 
purpose of the income tax legislation and provisions compelling disclosure is to enhance tax 
compliance. However, as has been shown, rather than hindering the attainment of this 
purpose the extension of legal privilege to all taxpayers regardless of the type of tax advisor 
they approach could actually enhance compliance. The privilege, it is argued, promotes 
candour thus enabling the tax advisor to be given all the necessary information about the 
client‘s tax affairs and will therefore be in a better position to give appropriate advice and 
where necessary dissuade clients from engaging in impermissible tax planning, which in 
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many cases may be attributed to ignorance. Tax advisors will be in a position to advise clients 
on permissible tax planning opportunities. As such there is no rational connection between 
the differential treatment and tax compliance, with the result that it can be concluded that the 
equality clause is infringed.  
As has been shown, the infringement of the rights to privacy and equality in this instance is 
not justifiable under section 36 of the Constitution. Although the differentiation is authorised 
by the common law, the differentiation is arbitrary hence one cannot say that it is in terms of 
a law of general application. The infringements are not reasonable and justifiable in an open 
and democratic society based on the values of human dignity, equality and freedom. The 
rights in question are fundamental and any reason for their infringement must be exceptional. 
The importance of tax compliance is beyond doubt but the extent of the limitation in relation 
to its efficacy is debatable. The purpose is indeed achieved by the extension of privilege to 
communications with non-legal tax practitioners and thus this is a less restrictive means of 
achieving the stated purpose. The fraud exception rule, as one of the conditions for the 
operation of the privilege, will ensure that the privilege is not abused. The extension of the 
privilege is made easier by the fact that it is amenable to extension. 
5.3 Legal professional privilege is amenable to extension 
As noted earlier in the discussion the rationale for the existence of legal professional privilege 
is the promotion of candour between an attorney and his client so that he can advise his client 
sufficiently with all the facts before him. It has been stated that this is aimed at ensuring that 
the justice system functions efficiently. This rationale can be applied to tax affairs as well. 
The promotion of candour between a tax advisor and his client ensures that the client is 
advised accordingly and although tax compliance cannot be placed on the same pedestal as 
the justice system on a moral plane, it is nevertheless very important to the functioning of the 
state. If taxpayers avail all necessary information before their advisors, they are provided 
with adequate advice and are thus able to plan their tax affairs within the letter and spirit of 
the law, thus enhancing tax compliance.  
Legal professional privilege has evolved from being a gentleman‘s oath to being a 
substantive right belonging to the client. The privilege vests in the client and not the 
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professional hence some have been prompted to state that the term ‗legal professional 
privilege‘ is a misnomer. The client should be able to claim the privilege regardless of the 
professional title attached to the advisor. The nature of the privilege as a right means that its 
abrogation should only be in exceptional circumstances and this does not qualify as one. The 
conditions for the operation of the privilege are also amenable and can be adapted to suit the 
intentions of the legislature.  
5.4 Whither South Africa? 
In the event that South Africa decides to extend legal professional privilege to non-legal tax 
practitioners the formal regulation of all tax practitioners regardless of profession is a 
prerequisite. Formal regulation is a dominant motivation behind the proposed Tax 
Administration Bill and will serve to ensure that the privilege if promulgated will not be 
abused.  
The extension of the privilege to non-legal tax advisors in other jurisdictions has been by way 
of legislative intervention. Although the judiciary in South Africa has an obligation in terms 
of the Constitution to develop the common law one must remember the principle of judicial 
deference which governs the separation of powers. Due to the complexities which may be 
encountered in extending the privilege to non-legal tax advisors the legislature is better 
placed to do so in a way in which safeguards are put in place so as to avoid abuse of the 
privilege. 
The best way to approach this problem would be to adopt a hybrid approach which extracts 
the best from the American section 7525 as well as from the New Zealand approach. First of 
all, in order for the privilege to be effective, the statute must be grounded in the common law. 
This will ensure that the statutory privilege will develop in tandem with the common law as 
any judicial pronouncements on the common law privilege will automatically be read into the 
statute and thus there is no need for constant amendment of the statute. This will also mean 
that the application of the statute will be certain as it will be informed by precedent, making 
the application of the privilege less problematic as there is less chance of the statute being 
interpreted in a way the drafters may not have contemplated. 
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Secondly, the wording of the statute must be clear and unambiguous as to the advisors to 
whom the privilege is to apply. In order to address the concerns of attorneys with regard to 
the ethical obligations of the tax advisors it will be prudent to have a statutory body to which 
advisors will be accountable for unethical conduct and this might involve creating a formal 
regulatory body for all tax practitioners or increasing the jurisdiction of regulatory bodies 
such as the South African Institute of Chartered Accountants to cover those tax practitioners 
who are neither accountants nor attorneys. This body should have the powers to regulate the 
industry in much the same way as the Law Society regulates the legal profession.  
The statute should also be clear with regard to the type of advice that will be protected. In this 
regard it is essential to combine the definitions of ―tax advice‖ found in the American section 
7525 as well as the New Zealand section 20B.  A communication should qualify for 
protection if it is created or prepared  for the purpose of providing and obtaining advice about 
the operation and effect of tax laws, to the extent that such a communication would be 
considered a privileged communication if it were between a taxpayer and  an attorney. This 
would mean that information used for documents such as tax returns would not be protected 
as they would constitute factual matters which would not in any case be protected even if 
they were communicated between a taxpayer and attorney.  
The privilege should not be limited in operation to criminal matters. As has been shown 
above such a limitation would result in confusion as to when a tax matter becomes a criminal 
matter, thus, leading to the privilege being rendered redundant. Rather it is imperative that the 
privilege be applicable in both civil and criminal matters because when it comes to the 
attorney-client privilege there is no such demarcation. This is in keeping with the above 
recommendation that communications prepared for the purpose of providing or obtaining 
advice about the operation and effect of tax laws should be protected to the extent that such a 
communication would be privileged if it were between a taxpayer and an attorney. In terms of 
limitations with regard to instances of impermissible tax planning it will be prudent to 
incorporate such limitations within the reportable arrangements provisions of the Income Tax 
Act, that is, sections 80M to 80T. Because of the uncertainty as to what constitutes 
impermissible tax avoidance it will be problematic to cover such arrangements within the 
ambit of the fraud exception rule. Although tax avoidance is not illegal and thus within the 
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letter of the law it goes against the spirit of the law. Tax evasion as a form of fraud is already 
covered by the exception. 
Unlike the New Zealand approach, there should be no special procedure for claiming the 
protection of the privilege. As shown above the process in section 20D is arduous and results 
in unnecessary delays and costs for the taxpayer. One must claim the privilege against any 
coercive information gathering power of the Commissioner by asserting that such 
communications are privileged and in instances where the Commissioner contests this the 
courts should have the power, in much the same way as they do in the common law, to 
analyse such information and where possible to excise privileged parts, leaving those sections 
to which privilege does not apply. This approach is in direct contrast to the section 7525 
approach where an unprivileged part of the communication renders the whole communication 
devoid of protection. The proposed approach will ensure that there is no automatic waiver of 
the privilege. In the same vein it is submitted that the privilege must be capable of waiver in 
the same way as the common law privilege, that is, expressly, impliedly as well as imputedly.  
5.5 Proposal for extending legal professional privilege to non-legal tax 
practitioners 
A proposed provision for the extension of statutory privilege for non-legal tax advisors is set 
out below. Following the approach of the other jurisdictions to do so, such a privilege should 
be in the form of a separate Act grounded in the common law. The formulation of the 
provision must be such that the same common law protections of confidentiality which apply 
to a communication between a taxpayer and an attorney shall also apply to a communication 
between a taxpayer and a registered tax practitioner to the extent that such communication 
would be considered a privileged communication it were between a taxpayer and an attorney. 
There must also be a limitation on the applicability of the privilege in cases where it can be 
shown that the communication in question was made in furtherance of tax evasion. This 
should also apply where a communication is in made in connection with an impermissible 
avoidance arrangement as defined in section 80A of the Income Tax Act. Such a limitation 
will definitely be bolstered by section 104 read with section 105A which set out offences and 
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penalties as well as reporting of unprofessional conduct in instances where an advisor assists 
a taxpayer to evade assessment or taxation. 
There should be no ambiguity with regard to the definitions of the essential terms in the Act. 
It is proposed that the definition of ―tax advisor‖ be wide enough to cover any individual duly 
registered with the South African Institute of Chartered Accountants, the South African 
Institute of Tax Practitioners as well as those practitioners registered in terms of section 67A 
of the Income Tax Act as a tax advisor. The term ―tax advice‖ should mean any 
communication prepared or made for the purpose of providing or obtaining an opinion about 
the operation and effect of tax laws, excluding factual information such as that used in the 
preparation of tax returns. 
5.6 Conclusion 
It is recommended that the application of legal professional privilege to communications 
made with non-legal tax practitioners should be reviewed. This will not only be in keeping 
with other jurisdictions from which we draw some of our tax jurisprudence but will stop the 
continued infringement of the rights of the taxpayers who choose that avenue for tax advice. 
This will give effect to South Africa‘s commitment to a state founded on the values of human 
dignity, equality and freedom.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 
74. General provisions with regard to information, documents or things.—(1)  For the 
purposes of this section and sections 74A, 74B, 74C, 74D and 75— 
“administration of this Act” means the— 
(a) obtaining of full information in relation to any—  
(i). amount received by or accrued to any person;  
(ii). property disposed of for no consideration; and 
(iii). payment made or liability incurred by any person; 
[Para. (a) substituted by s. 6 of Act No. 61 of 2008.] 
Wording of Sections 
(b) ascertaining the correctness of any return, financial statement, document, 
declaration of facts, valuation or other information in the Commissioner‘s 
possession; 
[Para. (b) substituted by s. 6 of Act No. 61 of 2008.] 
Wording of Sections 
(c) determination of the liability of any person for any tax, duty or levy and any 
interest or penalty in relation thereto leviable under this Act; 
(d) collecting of any such liability; 
(e) ascertaining whether an offence in terms of this Act has been committed; 
( f ) ascertaining whether a person has, other than in relation to a matter 
contemplated in paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) of this definition, complied 
with the provisions of this Act; 
(g) enforcement of any of the Commissioner‘s remedies under this Act to ensure 
that any obligation imposed upon any person by or under this Act, is complied 
with; and 
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(h) performance of any other administrative function which is necessary for the 
carrying out of the provisions of this Act; 
“authorisation letter” means a written authorisation granted by the Commissioner, or by 
any person designated by the Commissioner for this purpose or occupying a post 
designated by the Commissioner for this purpose, to an officer to inspect, audit, 
examine or obtain, as contemplated in section 74B, any information, documents or 
things; 
[Definition of ―authorisation letter‖ substituted by s. 51 of Act No. 60 of 2001.] 
74A Furnishing of information, documents or things by any person.—The 
Commissioner or any officer may, for the purposes of the administration of this Act in 
relation to any taxpayer, require such taxpayer or any other person to furnish such 
information (whether orally or in writing) documents or things as the Commissioner or 
such officer may require. 
[S. 74A inserted by s. 14 of Act No. 46 of 1996.] 
74B. Obtaining of information, documents or things at certain premises.— 
(1) The Commissioner, or an officer named in an authorisation letter, may, for the 
purposes of the administration of this Act in relation to any taxpayer, require such 
taxpayer or any other person, with reasonable prior notice, to furnish, produce or 
make available any such information, documents or things as the Commissioner 
or such officer may require to inspect, audit, examine or obtain. 
(2) For the purposes of the inspection, audit, examination or obtaining of any such 
information, documents or things, the Commissioner or an officer contemplated 
in subsection (1), may call on any person— 
(a) at any premises; and 
(b) at any time during such person‘s normal business hours. 
(3) For the purposes of subsection (2), the Commissioner or any officer contemplated 
in subsection (1), shall not enter any dwelling-house or domestic premises 
(except any part thereof as may be occupied or used for the purposes of trade) 
without the consent of the occupant. 
(4) Any officer exercising any power under this section, shall on demand produce the 
authorisation letter issued to him. 
[S. 74B inserted by s. 14 of Act No. 46 of 1996.] 
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74C Inquiry.— 
(1) The Commissioner or an officer contemplated in section 74 (4) may authorise any 
person to conduct an inquiry for the purposes of the administration of this Act. 
(2) Where the Commissioner, or any officer contemplated in section 74 (4), 
authorises a person to conduct an inquiry, the Commissioner or such officer shall 
apply to a judge for an order designating a presiding officer before whom the 
inquiry is to be held. 
(3) A judge may, on application by the Commissioner or any officer contemplated in 
section 74 (4), grant an order in terms of which a person contemplated in 
subsection (7) is designated to act as presiding officer at the inquiry contemplated 
in this section. 
[Sub-s. (3) substituted by s. 28 of Act No. 28 of 1997.] 
Wording of Sections 
(4) An application under subsection (2) shall be supported by information supplied 
under oath or solemn declaration, establishing the facts on which the application 
is based. 
(5) A judge may grant the order referred to in subsection (3) if he is satisfied that 
there are reasonable grounds to believe that— 
(a) (i) there has been non-compliance by any person with his 
obligations in terms of this Act; or 
(ii) an offence in terms of this Act has been committed by any 
person;  
(b) information, documents or things are likely to be revealed which may 
afford proof of— 
(i) such non-compliance; or 
(ii) the committing of such offence; and 
(c) the inquiry referred to in the application is likely to reveal such 
information, documents or things. 
(6) An order under subsection (3) shall, inter alia— 
(a) name the presiding officer; 
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(b) refer to the alleged non-compliance or offence to be inquired into; 
(c) identify the person alleged to have failed to comply with the provisions of 
the Act or to have committed the offence; and 
(d) be reasonably specific as to the ambit of the inquiry. 
(7) Any presiding officer shall be a person appointed by the Minister of Finance in 
terms of section 83A (4). 
(8) For the purposes of an inquiry contemplated in this section, a presiding officer 
designated under subsection (3) shall— 
(a) determine the proceedings as he may think fit; 
(b) have the same powers—  
(i) to enforce the attendance of witnesses and to compel them to give 
evidence or to produce evidential material; and  
(ii) relating to contempt committed during the proceedings as are vested 
in a President of the Special Court contemplated in section 83, and 
for those purposes section 84 and 85 shall apply mutatis mutandis; 
and 
[Para. (b) substituted by s. 43 (a) of Act No. 30 of 2000.] 
Wording of Sections 
(c) record the proceedings and evidence at an inquiry in such manner as he 
may think fit. 
(9) Any person may, by written notice issued by the presiding officer, be required to 
appear before him in order to be questioned under oath or solemn declaration for 
the purposes of an inquiry contemplated in this section. 
(10) The notice contemplated in subsection (9) shall specify the— 
(a) place where such inquiry will be conducted;  
(b) date and time of such inquiry; and  
(c) reasons for such inquiry. 
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(11) Any person whose affairs are investigated in the course of an inquiry 
contemplated in this section, shall be entitled to be present at the inquiry during 
such time as his affairs are investigated, unless on application by the person 
contemplated in subsection (1), the presiding officer directs otherwise on the 
ground that the presence of the person and his representative, or either of them, 
would be prejudicial to the effective conduct of the inquiry. 
[Sub-s. (11) substituted by s. 43 (b) of Act No. 30 of 2000.] 
Wording of Sections 
(12) Any person contemplated in subsection (9) has the right to have a legal 
representative present during the time that he appears before the presiding officer. 
[Sub-s. (12) substituted by s. 43 (b) of Act No. 30 of 2000.] 
Wording of Sections 
(13) An inquiry contemplated in this section shall be private and confidential and the 
presiding officer shall at any time on application by the person whose affairs are 
investigated or any other person giving evidence or the person contemplated in 
subsection (1), exclude from such inquiry or require to withdraw therefrom, all or 
any persons whose attendance is not necessary for the inquiry. 
[Sub-s. (13) substituted by s. 43 (b) of Act No. 30 of 2000.] 
Wording of Sections 
(14) Any person may, at the discretion of the presiding officer, be compensated for his 
reasonable expenditure related to the attendance of an inquiry, by way of witness 
fees in accordance with the tariffs prescribed in terms of section 51bis of the 
Magistrates‘ Courts Act, 1944 (Act No. 32 of 1944). 
(15) The provisions with regard to the preservation of secrecy contained in section 4 
shall mutatis mutandis apply to any person present at the questioning of any 
person contemplated in subsection (9), including the person being questioned. 
[Sub-s. (15) substituted by s. 43 (c) of Act No. 30 of 2000.] 
Wording of Sections 
(16) Subject to subsection (17), the evidence given under oath or solemn declaration at 
an inquiry may be used by the Commissioner in any subsequent proceedings to 
which the person whose affairs are investigated is a party or to which a person 
who had dealings with such person is a party. 
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[Sub-s. (16) added by s. 43 (d) of Act No. 30 of 2000.] 
(17) (a) No person may refuse to answer any question during an inquiry on the 
grounds that it may incriminate him. 
(b) No incriminating evidence so obtained shall be admissible in any criminal 
proceedings against the person giving such evidence, other than in 
proceedings where that person stands trial on a charge relating to the 
administering or taking of an oath or the administering or making of an 
affirmation or the giving of false evidence or the making of a false 
statement in connection with such questions and answers, or a failure to 
answer questions lawfully put to him, fully and satisfactorily. 
[Sub-s. (17) added by s. 43 (d) of Act No. 30 of 2000.] 
(18) An inquiry in terms of this section shall proceed notwithstanding the fact that any 
civil or criminal proceedings are pending or contemplated against or involving 
any person contemplated in subsection (6) (c) or any witness or potential witness 
or any person whose affairs may be investigated in the course of such inquiry. 
[S. 74C inserted by s. 14 of Act No. 46 of 1996. Sub-s. (18) added by 
s. 43 (d) of Act No. 30 of 2000.] 
74D. Search and seizure. 
(1) For the purposes of the administration of this Act, a judge may, on 
application by the Commissioner or any officer contemplated in 
section 74 (4), issue a warrant, authorising the officer named therein to, 
without prior notice and at any time— 
(a) (i) enter and search any premises; and  
(ii) search any person present on the premises, provided that such search is 
conducted by an officer of the same gender as the person being searched, 
for any information. documents or things, that may afford evidence as to the 
non-compliance by any taxpayer with his obligations in terms of this Act; 
(b) seize any such information, documents or things; and 
(c) in carrying out any such search, open or cause to be opened or removed 
and opened, anything in which such officer suspects any information, 
documents or things to be contained. 
[Sub-s. (1) amended by s. 29 of Act No. 28 of 1997.] 
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Wording of Sections 
(2) An application under subsection (1) shall be supported by information supplied 
under oath or solemn declaration, establishing the facts on which the application 
is based. 
(3) A judge may issue the warrant referred to in subsection (1) if he is satisfied that 
there are reasonable grounds to believe that— 
(a) (i) there has been non-compliance by any person with his obligations in 
terms of this Act; or 
(ii) an offence in terms of this Act has been committed by any person;  
(b) information, documents or things are likely to be found which may afford 
evidence of—  
(i)  such non-compliance; or 
(ii) the committing of such offence; and 
(c) the premises specified in the application are likely to contain such information, 
documents or things. 
(4) A warrant issued under subsection (1) shall— 
(a) refer to the alleged non-compliance or offence in relation to which it is 
issued; 
(b) identify the premises to be searched; 
(c) identify the person alleged to have failed to comply with the provisions of 
the Act or to have committed the offence; and 
(d) be reasonably specific as to any information, documents or things to be 
searched for and seized. 
(5) Where the officer named in the warrant has reasonable grounds to believe that— 
(a) such information, documents or things are—  
(i) at any premises not identified in such warrant; and  
(ii) about to be removed or destroyed; and 
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(b) a warrant cannot be obtained timeously to prevent such removal or 
destruction, 
such officer may search such premises and further exercise all the powers granted 
by this section, as if such premises had been identified in a warrant. 
(6) Any officer who executes a warrant may seize, in addition to the information, 
documents or things referred to in the warrant, any other information, documents 
or things that such officer believes on reasonable grounds afford evidence of the 
non-compliance with the relevant obligations or the committing of an offence in 
terms of this Act. 
(7) The officer exercising any power under this section shall on demand produce the 
relevant warrant (if any). 
(8) The Commissioner, who shall take reasonable care to ensure that the information, 
documents or things are preserved, may retain them until the conclusion of any 
investigation into the non-compliance or offence in relation to which the 
information, documents or things were seized or until they are required to be used 
for the purposes of any legal proceedings under this Act, whichever event occurs 
last. 
(9) (a) Any person may apply to the relevant division of the High Court for the 
return of any information, documents or things seized under this section. 
[Para. (a) amended by s. 38 of Act No. 53 of 1999.] 
Wording of Sections 
(b) The court hearing such application may, on good cause shown, make such 
order as it deems fit. 
(10) The person to whose affairs any information, documents or things seized under 
this section relate, may examine and make extracts therefrom and obtain one copy 
thereof at the expense of the State during normal business hours under such 
supervision as the Commissioner may determine. 
[S. 74D inserted by s. 14 of Act No. 46 of 1996.] 
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Appendix 2 
80M. Reportable arrangements.— 
(1) An arrangement is a reportable arrangement if it is listed in subsection (2) or if 
any tax benefit is or will be derived or is assumed to be derived by any participant 
by virtue of that arrangement and the arrangement— 
(a) contains provisions in terms of which the calculation of ―interest‖ as 
defined in section 24J, finance costs, fees or any other charges is wholly or 
partly dependent on the assumptions relating to the tax treatment of that 
arrangement (otherwise than by reason of any change in the provisions of 
this Act or any other law administered by the Commissioner); 
(b) has any of the characteristics or characteristics which are substantially 
similar to those contemplated in section 80C (2) (b); 
(c) is or will be disclosed by any participant as giving rise to a financial 
liability for purposes of Generally Accepted Accounting Practice but not 
for purposes of this Act; 
(d) does not result in a reasonable expectation of a pre-tax profit for any 
participant; or 
(e) results in a reasonable expectation of a pre-tax profit for any participant 
that is less than the value of that tax benefit to that participant if both are 
discounted to a present value at the end of the first year of assessment 
when that tax benefit is or will be derived or is assumed to be derived on a 
consistent basis and using a reasonable discount rate for that participant. 
(2) The following arrangements are reportable arrangements: 
(a) Any arrangement which would have qualified as a ―hybrid equity 
instrument‖ as defined in section 8E, if the prescribed period had been 
10 years; 
(b) any arrangement which would have qualified as a ―hybrid debt 
instrument‖ as defined in section 8F, if the prescribed period in that 
section had been 10 years, but does not include any instrument listed on 
an exchange regulated in terms of the Securities Services Act, 2004 (Act 
No. 36 of 2004); or  
(c) any arrangement identified by the Minister by notice in the Gazette as 
an arrangement which is likely to result in any undue tax benefit. 
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(3) This section does not apply to any excluded arrangement contemplated in section 
80N. 
[S. 80M inserted by s. 6 (1) of Act No. 21 of 2006 with effect from 1 April, 
2008: Proclamation No. 13 in Government Gazette 30941 of 1 April, 2008.] 
80N. Excluded arrangements.— 
(1) An arrangement is an excluded arrangement if it is— 
(a) a loan, advance or debt in terms of which—  
(i) the borrower receives or will receive an amount of cash and agrees to 
repay at least the same amount of cash to the lender at a determinable 
future date; or  
(ii) the borrower receives or will receive a fungible asset and agrees to 
return an asset of the same kind and of the same or equivalent 
quantity and quality to the lender at a determinable future date; 
(b)  a lease; 
(c) a transaction undertaken through an exchange regulated in terms of the 
Securities Services Act, 2004 (Act No. 36 of 2004); or 
(d) a transaction in participatory interests in a scheme regulated in terms of 
the Collective Investment Schemes Control Act, 2002 (Act No. 45 of 
2002). 
(2) Subsection (1) applies only to an arrangement that— 
(a) is undertaken on a stand-alone basis and is not directly or indirectly 
connected to, or directly or indirectly dependent upon, any other 
arrangement (whether entered into between the same or different parties); 
or 
(b) would have qualified as having been undertaken on a stand-alone basis as 
required by paragraph (a), were it not for a connected arrangement that is 
entered into for the sole purpose of providing security and where no tax 
benefit is obtained or enhanced by virtue of that security arrangement. 
(3) Subsection (1) does not apply to any arrangement that is entered into— 
(a) with the main purpose of obtaining or enhancing a tax benefit; or 
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(b) in a specific manner or form that enhances or will enhance a tax benefit. 
(4) The Minister may determine an arrangement to be an excluded arrangement by 
notice in the Gazette, if he or she is satisfied that the arrangement is not likely to 
lead to an undue tax benefit. 
[S. 80N inserted by s. 6 (1) of Act No. 21 of 2006 with effect from 1 April, 
2008: Proclamation No. 13 in Government Gazette 30941 of 1 April, 2008.] 
80O. Disclosure obligation.— 
(1) The promoter must disclose such information in respect of a reportable 
arrangement as is contemplated in section 80P. 
(2) If there is no promoter in relation to an arrangement or if the promoter is 
not a resident, all other participants must disclose the information 
contemplated in section 80P in respect of the reportable arrangement. 
(3) A participant need not disclose the information in respect of a reportable 
arrangement if that participant obtains a written statement from— 
(a) the promoter that the promoter has disclosed that reportable arrangement 
as required by this Part; or 
(b) any other participant, if subsection (2) applies, that the other participant 
has disclosed that reportable arrangement as required by this Part. 
(4) The reportable arrangement must be disclosed within 60 days after any amount is 
first received by or accrued to any participant or is first paid or actually incurred 
by any participant in terms of the arrangement. 
[Sub-s. (4) substituted by s. 6 (1) of Act No. 9 of 2007 with effect from the 
date that s. 80O of this Act comes into operation: 1 April, 2008.] 
Wording of Sections 
(5) The Commissioner may grant extension for disclosure for a further 60 days, if 
reasonable grounds exist for that extension. 
[S. 80O inserted by s. 6 (1) of Act No. 21 of 2006 with effect from 1 April, 
2008: Proclamation No. 13 in Government Gazette 30941 of 1 April, 2008.] 
80P. Information to be submitted.—The promoter or participant, as the case may be, must 
submit, in relation to the reportable arrangement, in the form and manner (including 
electronically) and at such place as may be prescribed by the Commissioner— 
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(a) a detailed description of all its steps and key features; 
(b) a detailed description of the assumed tax benefits for all participants, including, 
but not limited to, tax deductions and deferred income; 
[Para. (b) substituted by s. 7 (1) of Act No. 9 of 2007 with effect from the 
date that s. 80P of this Act comes into operation: 1 April, 2008.] 
Wording of Sections 
(c) the names, registration numbers and registered addresses of all participants; 
(d) a list of all its agreements; and 
(e) any financial model that embodies its projected tax treatment. 
[S. 80P inserted by s. 6 (1) of Act No. 21 of 2006 with effect from 1 April, 2008: 
Proclamation No. 13 in Government Gazette 30941 of 1 April, 2008.] 
80Q Reportable arrangement reference number.— 
(1) The Commissioner must, after receipt of the information contemplated in section 
80P, issue a reportable arrangement reference number to each participant. 
(2) The issuing of a reportable arrangement reference number is for administrative 
purposes only. 
[S. 80Q inserted by s. 6 (1) of Act No. 21 of 2006 with effect from 1 April, 2008: 
Proclamation No. 13 in Government Gazette 30941 of 1 April, 2008.] 
80R. Request for information.— 
(1) The Commissioner may, in relation to any arrangement, require a participant or 
any other person to furnish such information (whether orally or in writing), 
documents or things as the Commissioner may require. 
(2) The information, documents or things must be submitted to the Commissioner in 
such form and manner (including electronically) and at such place as may be 
prescribed by the Commissioner. 
80S. Penalties.— 
(1) Any participant who fails to disclose the information in respect of a reportable 
arrangement as required by section 80O or section 80R shall be liable to a penalty 
of R1 million. 
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(2) The Commissioner may reduce the penalty contemplated in subsection (1), if— 
(a) there are extenuating circumstances and the participant remedies the non-
disclosure within a reasonable time; or 
(b) if the penalty is disproportionate to the assumed tax benefit. 
[S. 80S inserted by s. 6 (1) of Act No. 21 of 2006 with effect from 1 April, 
2008: Proclamation No. 13 in Government Gazette 30941 of 1 April, 2008.] 
80T. Definitions.—For the purposes of this Part— 
“arrangement” means any transaction, operation or scheme; 
“financial benefit” means any reduction in the cost of finance, including interest, 
finance charges, costs, fees, and discounts in the redemption amount; 
“participant” in relation to a reportable arrangement means— 
(a) any promoter; or 
(b) any company or trust which directly or indirectly derives or assumes that it 
derives a tax benefit or financial benefit by virtue of a reportable arrangement; 
“pre-tax profit” in relation to an arrangement, means the profit of a participant 
resulting from that arrangement before deducting any normal tax, which profit must be 
determined in accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting Practice after taking 
into account all costs and expenditure incurred by that participant in connection with 
the arrangement and after deducting any foreign taxes paid or payable by that 
participant; 
“promoter” in relation to a reportable arrangement means any person who is 
principally responsible for organising, designing, selling, financing or managing that 
reportable arrangement; 
“reportable arrangement” means any arrangement as contemplated in section 80M; 
“tax” includes any tax, levy, duty or other liability imposed by this Act or any other 
Act administered by the Commissioner; 
“tax benefit” includes any avoidance, postponement or reduction of any liability for 
tax. 
[S. 80T inserted by s. 6 (1) of Act No. 21 of 2006 with effect from 1 April, 2008: 
Proclamation No. 13 in Government Gazette 30941 of 1 April, 2008.] 
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